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This report aims to trigger a deeper reﬂection amongst ﬁnancial policymakers and regulators
concerning the relevance of systemic environmental risks to banking sector stability. Recent history
demonstrates linkages between risks arising both from the environment itself (e.g. extreme
weather events) and from humanity’s management of environmental resources (e.g. soil quality)
and banking instability. Evidence suggests this trend will become more pronounced and complex as
humanity breaches more planetary boundaries. 
However, international banking regulation (i.e. the Basel Capital Accord or ‘Basel III’) does not
address the ﬁnancial stability risks associated with systemic environmental risks. Nevertheless, a
group of countries such as Brazil, China and Peru, along with their banking industries, have adopted
regulatory and governance practices to address systemic environmental risks. The Basel Committee
should learn more from their experiences and consider reforms to the Basel III Pillar 2 Supervisory
Review framework and the Pillar 3 Market Discipline framework that would involve recognising
systemic environmental risks as material risks that potentially threaten banking stability. 
In addition to Basel III, certain ﬁnancial policies should be considered. Central bank monetary policy
measures could enhance the provision of bank credit to environmentally sustainable economic
activity. Also, the role of ﬁnancial innovation should be considered as it relates to an array of credit
risk transfer instruments that can be used to enhance the amount and quality of funding available
for environmentally sustainable economic activity. Finally, ﬁnancial policy and regulation should be
aligned with environmental policy and regulation and coordinated so that the objectives and
understanding of each area of expertise can be shared between the relevant agencies. This would
create synergies for policy development and regulatory practices and standards.
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5Foreword – The Banking Environment Initiative and
Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership
The Banking Environment Initiative (BEI) was
founded by a group of leading bank Chief
Executives in 2010 and is convened by the
University of Cambridge Institute for
Sustainability Leadership (CISL). It was formed out
of the belief that a fresh approach was needed by
banks to help support socially and
environmentally sustainable economic
activity.
The BEI’s initial focus has been threefold: ﬁrst,
developing customer partnerships to re-align
banks’ goals with those of the real economy;
second, driving industry-level consensus on
standards to accelerate what banks can do
individually, and third, supporting innovation in
products and services to stimulate the market
through commercially viable action. 
With the help of CISL’s networks of corporate
leaders and its ability to drive learning and
change across diverse groups, the BEI has
demonstrated how this model can be applied to
ﬁnancing activities that support commodity
supply chains. The BEI’s ‘Soft Commodities’
Compact with the Consumer Goods Forum is
triggering an evolution in how banks and their
corporate customers, through trade ﬁnance
product and services, direct capital towards
sustainable practices in agricultural supply chains.
However, we have always known that it takes
more than strong corporate leadership to change
practices at an industry level; those who set the
rules that govern the system also have a role.
Since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, we have
witnessed some regulators, especially in the
faster-growth economies, concluding that
ﬁnancial stability may not only emanate from
within the ﬁnancial system itself. As was
powerfully demonstrated at the China-focused
BEI Forum 2014 in Hong Kong, some countries
are already acting on their view that systemic
environmental risks can also aﬀect stability.
In anticipation that momentum behind this trend
would only build – as well as the simple fact that
some of the emerging economies where this
thinking is already further progressed will be
increasingly inﬂuential on the global stage – the
BEI decided, on behalf of its members, to initiate
an independent process to look at these issues
and how regulators around the world are
addressing them. We were delighted that
Professor Kern Alexander, a CISL Fellow and Chair
in Law and Finance at the University of Zurich,
agreed to lead the study. We were also very
pleased that UNEP FI, with its unique
perspective at the interface between
governments and the ﬁnance sector, also
recognised the value of this inquiry and
decided to co-commission the work with us.
This study assesses the links between systemic
environmental risks and ﬁnancial stability and
oﬀers insights into how some members of the
Basel Committee are already acting on such links.
Building on this leadership at a national level, the
focus then turns to how such approaches might
be harmonised internationally.
As the report itself says, this is a study that
clearly has profound implications. Further
analysis will certainly be required to assess
the feasibility of implementing its various
recommendations and we look forward to
playing an active role in that debate.
Polly Courtice LVO, Director, University of
Cambridge Institute for Sustainability
Leadership (CISL)
Jeremy Wilson, 
Chairman, BEI Working Group
6Foreword from the UNEP Finance Initiative
While the global economy continues to be
aﬀected by the profound ﬁnancial crisis of 2008,
the world faces the twin challenges of dealing
with the consequences of climate change and an
unsustainable path for economic growth.
These trends are not unrelated and, since its
inception in 1992, UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP
FI) has been a ﬁrm believer in the role of the
ﬁnance sector in setting a new course towards a
greener economic model.
UNEP FI, the UN’s unique and dedicated ﬁnance
& sustainability partnership, was initiated by a
pioneering group of commercial banks and now
counts a strong, international banking
membership that coalesced in 2010 as the
Initiative’s Banking Commission.
The Banking Commission has pursued an agenda
with a strong focus on catalytic action on the
ground - it has supported, and continues to
support, many of the country frameworks on
sustainable ﬁnance alluded to in this report.
UNEP FI’s Position Paper at Rio+20 and the
subsequent holding of its Global Roundtable in
Beijing in 2013 with a focus on policy and
regulation have been instrumental in bringing
this topic to an international audience.
Professor Alexander’s report is the natural and
necessary next step in exploring the role that
ﬁnancial – and in particular banking – regulation
can play in the transition to a green economy.
Not only does it provide clarity on the links
between environmental sustainability and
economic stability, clarity that is needed to
establish the pertinence of addressing
environmental risk in banking regulation; but it
also shows that in today’s world both banking
practitioners and their regulators can be found
willing to engage constructively in the global
policy debate on how to build “the future we
want”.
Indeed, while a banking regulatory regime which
is cogniscent of environmental challenges and
which as a consequence provides appropriate
guidance to banks is important, of greater
importance still is the emergence of a robust and
continuous dialogue between ﬁnancial and
environmental policy-makers. The changes
required will not be possible without greater
policy coherence and cohesion between these
two constituencies.
We are proud to have partnered with the
BEI/CISL for this ﬁrst research piece on
international ﬁnancial regulation and
environmental risks, harnessing the full power of
Cambridge’s academic excellence. Professor
Alexander’s paper is intended to provoke debate,
and it is our aspiration that the content, the
conclusions and the recommendations will serve
to inspire the ﬁnancial policy community to a
new way of thinking about the interdependence
of ﬁnance and sustainability. We look forward to
participating in the engagement which will
follow, and in the further research and analysis
which will contribute to this dialogue.
Charles Anderson 
Head, UNEP FI Secretariat
Dag Arne Kristensen 
Chair, UNEP FI Banking Commission
7In the wake of the 2007-08 ﬁnancial crisis, an
extensive reform of banking regulation was
initiated to “generate strong, sustainable and
balanced global growth”. At the same time,
the Earth’s planetary boundaries – deﬁned as
thresholds that, if crossed, could generate
unacceptable environmental changes for
humanity – are under increasing stress and
represent a source of increasing cost to the
global economy. Experts argue that such
‘systemic environmental risks’ may be
amongst the biggest risks that humanity faces
today. This study analyses whether the Basel
Capital Accord (‘Basel III’) adequately
addresses systemic environmental risks in the
context of its overriding objective of banking
stability.
Core Findings
The analysis presented in this report suggests
that the regulatory framework that governs
today’s banking system may not be being used to
its full capacity; with some notable exceptions,
systemic environmental risks appear to be in the
collective blind spot of bank supervisors.
Despite the fact that history demonstrates direct
and indirect links between systemic
environmental risks and banking sector stability
and that evidence suggests this trend will
become more pronounced and complex as
humanity breaches more planetary boundaries,
the current Basel Capital Accord does not take
explicit account of, and therefore only marginally
addresses, these issues.
By failing to addresses systemic environmental
risks, Basel III is arguably overlooking an
important source of risk to the ﬁnancial system
and broader economy, despite its overriding
objective of guaranteeing banking stability.
However, this report also oﬀers insights that
solutions are within reach, should regulators and
industry practitioners work together proactively.
A number of national authorities, especially in
emerging markets such as Brazil, China and Peru,
are already acting to use the existing regulatory
framework to address these links. Opportunities
exist within the current Basel Capital Accord to
learn from these practices and to raise the
standard of how systemic environmental risks
are managed internationally. 
Additional options relating to monetary policy
and measures to increase the potential for long-
term investors to allocate capital to
environmentally sustainable activities are also
available to regulators.
Executive brieﬁng
The role of the ﬁnancial system in the economy and broader society is to
provide the necessary ﬁnancing and liquidity for human and economic
activity to thrive – not only today but also tomorrow. In other words, its
role is to fund a stable and sustainable economy. The role of ﬁnancial
regulators is to ensure that excessive risks that would threaten the stability
of the ﬁnancial system – and hence imperil the stability and sustainability
of the economy – are not taken.
“ ...the regulatory framework
that governs today’s
banking system may not be
being used to its full
capacity […] Basel III is
arguably overlooking an
important source of risk to
the ﬁnancial system and
broader economy”
8Next steps
These ﬁndings and recommendations clearly have profound implications. Further research is
necessary to assess the feasibility of their implementation. CISL and UNEP FI are keen to
engage a multi-disciplinary and international process to this eﬀect. This would include learning
lessons from those national authorities that have already taken leadership steps and working
with market actors to establish the most appropriate roles for them to play.
Recommendations
1. The Basel Committee should explicitly acknowledge environmental risks and their
increasing impact on the stability and sustainability of the economy as an emerging source
of systemic risk for banks and banking stability. On this basis it should encourage and
support bank regulators to work with banks to adopt current best practice in the
management of environmental issues, and to collect the necessary data and conduct
analysis to reﬁne the banking sectors' understanding of, and ability to address, systemic
environmental risk in the future.
2. Bank supervisors should then explore the feasibility of incorporating forward-looking
scenarios that estimate the potential ﬁnancial stability impact of supplying credit to
environmentally unsustainable or sustainable activities over time into their Pillar 2 –
Supervisory Review stress tests.
3. Bank supervisors should also examine Pillar 3 – Market Discipline to assess the feasibility of
banks disclosing information about their exposure to, and management of, systemic
environmental risks in a standardised manner across countries.
4. National ﬁnancial authorities should consider their role in developing targeted monetary
policy measures, such as accepting certain high-quality ‘green’ assets from banks as collateral
for central bank loans that would assist banks in providing more funding for environmentally
sustainable economic activity. 
5. As ﬁnancial regulators are assessing standards and rules that allow banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions to use simple and transparent ﬁnancial instruments and investment
structures to facilitate longer-term investment, they should aim to encourage more
investment in 'green’ assets and other forms of environmentally sustainable economic
activity. For instance, sustainable asset-backed securities issued in transparent and simple
structures could increase long-term investment in ‘green’ credit and related assets. 
6. Finally, far greater eﬀort must be made to ensure that ﬁnancial and environmental policies
and regulations are coordinated across government agencies and departments in their
promulgation, implementation and enforcement.
9The role of the ﬁnancial system in the economy
and broader society is to provide the necessary
ﬁnancing and liquidity for human and economic
activity to thrive – not only today but also
tomorrow. In other words, its role is to fund a
stable and sustainable economy. The role of
ﬁnancial regulators is to ensure that excessive
risks that would threaten the stability of the
ﬁnancial system – and hence imperil the
stability and sustainability of the economy – are
not taken.
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08
that resulted in trillions of dollars in losses and
bank bail-outs, banking regulation has
undergone, and continues to go through, an
extensive reform process, the core aim of
which is to “generate strong, sustainable and
balanced global growth” (G20 Summit Leaders’
Statement 2009).
At the same time, the Earth’s planetary
boundaries – deﬁned as thresholds that, if
crossed, could undermine “the safe space for
human development” (Rockström et al 2009) –
are under increasing stress, and represent a
source of increasing cost to the global
economy. Appendix A explains the concept of
planetary boundaries in more detail. Experts
argue that such ‘systemic environmental risks’
may be amongst the biggest risks that
humanity faces today.1 The scale of the
economic and social impacts of such risks and
of the economic transformation required to
address them are both signiﬁcant. A study by
the United Nations estimates that the annual
cost to the global economy of maintaining the
current scale of unsustainable economic
activity will reach nearly $28.6 trillion by 2050,
equivalent to 18 per cent of global GDP.2
Meanwhile, estimates indicate that around $1
trillion of additional investment in new green
infrastructure in energy, transport, buildings
and industry is needed annually to 2030 *(WEF,
2013). 
This study analyses whether the Basel Capital
Accord (‘Basel III’) adequately addresses
systemic environmental risks in the context of
its overriding objective of banking stability. It
examines the hypothesis that banking reform,
despite its best intentions, could actually be
overlooking – and even aggravating – an
important source of risk to the ﬁnancial system
and broader economy, namely systemic
environmental risks.
Origins and rationale for the study
This report was made possible by a partnership
between the Banking Environment Initiative
(BEI), which is convened by CISL, and UNEP FI’s
Banking Commission, with additional support
from Bloomberg LP. CISL and UNEP FI have
been working together with partners in the
banking industry for many years to address
issues on ﬁnance and sustainability. In the
context of this work, the role of ﬁnancial
regulation and policy in maintaining
environmental sustainability has become
increasingly apparent. CISL and UNEP FI are
keen to promote research on this complex and
under-studied topic as part of their work
towards a ﬁnancial sector that fully
understands, and plays its role in achieving,
environmentally sustainable, ﬁnancially stable
and socially inclusive economic development.
This work arrives at a critical moment. In
January 2014, the United Nations Environment
Programme launched its two-year Inquiry into
the alignment of the global ﬁnancial system
with long-term, sustainable development.3 This
comes in the wake of Rio+20, in which context
the United Nations is striving to establish a set
of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and
is exploring the means of implementing and
ﬁnancing them. In parallel, in 2012, the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) started
gathering ﬁnancial policymakers and regulators
around sustainability issues via the newly
created Sustainable Banking Network. 
Introduction
1 World Economic Forum ‘Global Risks 2010’: “The biggest risks facing the world today may be from slow failures or creeping risk...These are risks
linked to big shifts that are recognized....For example, global population growth, ageing and the ensuing rise in consumption, have implications for
resources, climate change, health and ﬁscal policy”. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2010.pdf (accessed 07.08.2014)
2 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 'Universal Ownership: Why environmental externalities matter to institutional investors’
www.unepﬁ.org/ﬁleadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.pdf (accessed 07.08.2014)
3 See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Background Paper: ‘Inquiry: Design of a Sustainable Financial System’ (2014) 
http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/ﬁnancialinquiry/portals/50215/Inquiry_expanded.pdf (accessed 07.08.2014)
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Methodology
The report is based on research that involved
interviews and written questionnaires for
practitioners in the banking industry, bank
regulators from selected developed and
emerging-market economies, oﬃcials from
international organisations, and representatives
from non-governmental organisations (details
are listed at the end of the report). The
research also consisted of analysis of the
provisions of Basel III and selected national
banking laws and regulations along with the
oﬃcial publications of international
organisations on systemic environmental risks,
such as the reports of the UN International
Panel on Climate Change. The analysis and
recommendations in the report were
considered and debated by members of the
study’s advisory group, consisting of academics,
ﬁnancial sector and legal practitioners,
regulators and representatives of governmental
bodies and the banking industry.
Report structure
Part 1 explores the evidence relating to the
question of whether systemic environmental
risks and banking sector stability are linked. It
reviews the experience of recent history as well
as a selection of available evidence to show
that systemic environmental risks are
associated with banking sector instability.
Part 2 examines how Basel III currently
addresses systemic environmental risks. The
question of whether Basel III creates a bias
against ﬁnance for environmentally sustainable
economic activities is explored and examples of
some countries that have already incorporated
systemic environmental risks into bank capital
regulation are highlighted. Part 2 then considers
what the Basel Committee might learn from the
example of these jurisdictions and identiﬁes
how these lessons might be taken forward by
the Basel Committee, focusing on Basel III’s
Pillar 2 ‘Supervisory Review’ and Pillar 3
‘Market Discipline’ framework.
Part 3 considers what other ﬁnancial policy
options are available outside of Basel III. This
includes an examination of the utility of certain
other monetary policy measures and the use of
innovative ﬁnancial instruments – such as
‘green’ asset-backed securities (ABS) – to
enhance the ﬂow of bank funds to
environmentally sustainable economic activity.
Part 4 presents speciﬁc recommendations for
ﬁnancial policymakers and regulators about
how Basel III and related areas of monetary and
ﬁnancial policy can be used more eﬀectively to
address systemic environmental risks. Finally,
Part 5 sets out the conclusions of this study
overall, including identifying next steps.
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Are systemic environmental risks and banking
instability linked?2
Economic historians have demonstrated
relationships between weather, agricultural
markets and ﬁnancial markets to show that
there are linkages between natural disasters
(e.g. drought) and ﬁnancial market instability.4
For example, the British economist William
Jevons (1884) famously argued that ﬁnancial
crises were produced by sunspots, which
could be shown to cause drought and poor
harvests in key agricultural producing
countries, which led to a downturn in
international trade resulting in signiﬁcant
bank losses and related ﬁnancial market
stresses. The United States suﬀered from dust
bowls in the farm belt states in the 1880s and
1890s and again in the 1930s due to soil
erosion caused by unsustainable farming
methods.5 The ensuing economic downturns
during these periods resulted in substantial
losses on bank loans and related ﬁnancial
market distress which spread contagion-like
through the regional economy.6
More recently, in the late twentieth and early
twenty-ﬁrst century, increased hurricane
activity in the Caribbean and south eastern
United States caused huge bank losses to
businesses and individuals directly impacted
by these high wind storms. Hurricane Andrew
caused $24 billion in damages to the south
Florida economy in 1992, while hurricanes
Rita, Wilma and Katrina each caused
widespread and extensive damage to
Caribbean economies and to the south
eastern United States. Hurricane Katrina came
ashore in south Florida in August 2005,
causing in excess of $200 billion in damages
and ranks as one of the costliest natural
disasters in U.S. history (Lambert, Noth and
Schüwer 2011). The damages led to high loan
losses and provisioning for banks that were
based in the impacted areas. The bank losses
led US regulators to review the adequacy of
bank risk models regarding credit risk and
hurricane damage.
Geological disasters such as earthquakes and
volcanoes can also result in banking and
ﬁnancial market distress. The Great Kanto
Earthquake of 1923, which struck the south
part of the Kato district in Japan, is among the
causes of the 1927 Showa ﬁnancial crisis
which culminated in the closure of numerous
banks (Shimizu & Fujimura 2010). Similarly,
the series of earthquakes which hit Turkey in
1999 required international ﬁnancial
assistance to rebuild the economy and avoid
the collapse of the banking system (Brinke
2013). Finally, the eruption of the Soufriere
Hills volcano on the island of Montserrat in
1998 destroyed Plymouth, the capital, and
forced 90 per cent of the inhabitants to leave
the island. The ﬁnancial system was severely
impacted, as the most important bank on the
island, the Montserrat Building Society (MBS)
collapsed due to a bank run (Clay et al 1999). 
Clearly, not all of these examples relate to
environmental risks that have been made
more likely or severe by human activity –
sunspot activity and geological disasters being
cases in point. However, there are conceptual
parallels between these natural disasters and
those that can be aggravated by human
activity in that, while inevitable in their
occurrence, speciﬁc incidents are diﬃcult to
predict and can have signiﬁcant impacts on
banking instability unless suﬃcient
precautions are taken. History therefore raises
the fundamental question of how bank
regulation can take into account the ﬁnancial
stability risks that can arise from
environmentally unsustainable practices. 
4 See generally for a review of the literature, J. Landon-Lane, H Rockoﬀ, R.H Steckel, (2011) The Economics of Climate Change: Adaptations Past and
Present pp 73-84.
5 See R Hornbeck, ‘The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl : Short and Long Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe’ (2012)
American Economic Review 102 (4), 1477-1507 
6 The United States economy was suﬀering a severe depression in the 1930s that had already caused hundreds of banks to fail across the country.
Economists have demonstrated how some of the banking sector distress experienced in these farm belt states can be attributed to the dustbowl
phenomenon. Hornbeck (2012) pp 1481-1483. 
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Further, scientists have now identiﬁed nine
biophysical thresholds for the Earth, which, if
crossed, could undermine “the safe space for
human development”. These thresholds –
known colloquially as ‘planetary boundaries’ –
represent “the ‘planetary playing ﬁeld’ for
humanity if we want to be sure of avoiding
major human-induced environmental change
on a global scale” (Rockström et al 2009).
Three of these boundaries (namely climate
change, biological diversity and nitrogen input
to the biosphere) are thought to have been
crossed already. 
Climate change is the boundary about which
we know the most. The International Panel on
Climate Change (2007, 2013, 2014) has
documented the scientiﬁc evidence in support
of the proposition that global warming and
ocean acidiﬁcation are caused by the carbon-
intensive activities of humans.
Carbon-intensive activities lead in the longer-
term to global warming, rising sea levels, and
ocean acidiﬁcation. More immediately, they
can lead to increasingly volatile weather
patterns, including extreme temperatures and
intensiﬁed ﬂooding of coastal and low-lying
areas, water shortages, and the health costs of
pollution. Existing extreme weather risk is
therefore being exacerbated by human activity;
moreover climate systems (in manner
analogous to ﬁnancial systems) are likely to
show non-linear responses to increased stress.
Some believe these externalities are
controlled and even mitigated through
adaptations in the economy, such as
alternative production processes, or re-
directing transport routes to avoid ﬂooded
coastlines (Nordhaus 2013). According to this
view, investors, aware of the scientiﬁc
evidence on the risks of climate change,
would be expected to discount the value of
high-carbon assets and increase the value of
low carbon assets, resulting in investment
shifting over time to low carbon assets (Bank
of England 2012). Nevertheless, the history of
ﬁnancial crises demonstrates that ﬁnancial
markets suﬀer from serious over and under-
estimation of risks because of asymmetric
information and moral hazard. These risks
translate into large externalities for the
economy and society (Kindleberger and
Aliber, 2011, 29-33; Schinasi, 2006, 47-66;
Eichengreen, 1999, 80-82). Moreover,
ﬁnancial stability is a public good; market
participants do not have the incentive to
invest the necessary capital to provide it
themselves because the beneﬁts of stability
spill over to free-riders who do not pay for it.
The absence of regulatory intervention to
address such market failures has been
criticised by some international
organisations.7 In January 2014 World Bank
President Jim Yong Kim, speaking at the World
Economic Forum, recognised the regulatory
gap in this area by stating that “ﬁnancial
regulators must take the lead in addressing
climate change risks”, and that they should
use pricing mechanisms to more eﬀectively
control negative externalities or systemic risks
associated with global warming.8
Therefore, the key questions addressed in the
following sections are: 
• To what extent are the economic and
ﬁnancial costs associated with systemic
environmental risks currently being
considered in banking regulation, and
• How might existing banking regulation
frameworks be utilised better to ensure
that systemic environmental risks are
appropriately managed and do not
contribute to banking sector instability in
the future? 
7 OECD (2013) p 12
8 OECD (2013) p 12
See World Bank Group President: ‘This Is the Year of Climate Action’: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2014/01/23/world-bank-group-
president-jim-yong-kim-remarks-at-davos-press-conference (accessed 06.08.2014)
“ ...the history of ﬁnancial crises
demonstrates that ﬁnancial
markets suﬀer from serious
over and under-estimation of
risks […] These risks translate
into large externalities for the
economy and society”
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Does Basel III adequately address systemic
environmental risks?3
By way of introduction, Basel III represents the
most important international ﬁnancial
regulation agreement. The ﬁrst Accord (Basel I)
was adopted in 1988 with two main objectives:
1) that internationally active banks hold a
minimum amount of capital against their risk-
based assets, and 2) to promote an
internationally level playing ﬁeld for cross-
border banking (Norton 1995). Although Basel
III is not legally binding under international law,
it is remarkable that most countries have
adopted it and claim to have implemented it.
The IMF observed that countries and banking
institutions which demonstrate that they have
implemented the Accord beneﬁt from a lower
cost of capital than countries and banks that
have not done so (Financial Stability Forum
2000). Some countries implement the Accord
faithfully and strictly enforce its requirements.9
However, the Accord is not mandatory; some
countries pick and choose what provisions to
comply with, while others impose stricter
standards. 
Although Basel I achieved its main objective of
increasing the level of regulatory capital in the
international banking system, it contained
many national discretions, loopholes and
incentives for banks to make riskier short-term
loans and to transfer less risky assets oﬀ their
balance sheets (Goodhart 2011). Basel II was
proposed in 1999 to address many of these
gaps and weaknesses. In doing so, Basel II
introduced the ‘three pillars’ concept – 1)
Minimum Capital, 2) Supervisory Review, and
3) Market Discipline. The three pillars are
designed to reinforce each other and to create
incentives for banks to enhance their risk
measurement and management. This
framework is represented in Figure 1.
Pillar 1 (Minimum Capital) allows banks to
calculate their regulatory capital by using
statistical models that rely mainly on their own
historic default and loss data to estimate their
credit, market, and operational risks. Pillar 2
sets forth principles of supervisory review that
authorise regulators to require banks to
comply with broad principles of corporate
governance and to adopt an internal capital
adequacy assessment process (ICAAP)
designed to enhance risk measurement and
management. Pillar 3 uses market discipline to
require banks to provide more information to
the market so shareholders and creditors can
monitor bank management more eﬀectively to
ensure the bank’s soundness and future
prospects.
Basel II expanded the use of risk weightings for
banks to estimate the riskiness of their assets.
A number of parameters determine an asset’s
risk weighting, including the maturity of the
loan, the probability of default, and the bank’s
loss and exposure given default. Assets with
lower risk weightings generally attract lower
capital charges, whereas assets with higher risk
weightings generally attract higher capital
charges. Corporate loans with short-term
maturities attract lower risk weightings (lower
capital charges), while corporate loans with
long-term maturities (7 years or more) attract
higher risk weightings (higher capital charges). 
Basel II allowed banks to use their own
estimates of credit and market risks to lower
their risk weightings for certain asset classes.
This risk management approach was shown to
be seriously ﬂawed when the global ﬁnancial
crisis began in August 2007; the risk weightings
of most European and US banks were shown to
be poor indicators of the ﬁnancial risks to
which banks were exposed.10
9 For example, the South African Reserve Bank (South Africa’s Bank Regulator) strictly implements and enforces the Basel Accord. See South African
Reserve Bank, 'South Africa's implementation of Basel II and Basel III'
www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/TheBaselCapitalAccordper cent28Baselper cent20IIper
cent29/Pages/AccordImplementationForumper cent28AIFper cent29.aspx (accessed 24.07.2014) and South African Reserve Bank, 'Guidance Note 9/2012
issued in terms of section 6(5) of the Banks Act, 1990- Capital Framework for South Africa based on the Basel III Framework',
www.resbank.co.za/Lists/Newsper cent20andper cent20Publications/Attachments/ 5154/G9per cent20ofper cent202012.pdf (accessed 24.07.2014)
10 Speciﬁcally, bank models to estimate their counter-party credit and liquidity risks in the asset-backed securities and derivatives markets underestimated
correlations across asset classes. Moreover, the opaqueness of the risk-weightings in the banking book made it very diﬃcult, if not impossible, for
investors to understand the true risk exposure of a bank. These factors contributed signiﬁcantly to an undercapitalisation of the banking system which
weakened its ability to absorb losses in the crisis. 
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The Basel Committee responded to the 2007-
2008 ﬁnancial crisis by adopting further
amendments to Basel II, which became known
as Basel III. Basel III requires an increased level
of Tier One regulatory capital to 4.5 per cent
from 2 per cent plus a 2.5 per cent capital
conservation buﬀer, a tighter deﬁnition of tier
one capital to include mainly ordinary
common shares and retained earnings, and up
to an additional 2.5 per cent countercyclical
capital ratio that will be adjusted across the
economic cycle.11 Basel III also contains liquidity
requirements that include a ratio for stable
wholesale funding, liquidity coverage ratios, and
an overall leverage ratio. Also, an additional
capital charge of up to 2.5 per cent regulatory
capital will be required for large and inter-
connected systemically important ﬁnancial
institutions (SIFIs). 
Despite signiﬁcant increases in capital and
liquidity requirements, Basel III essentially
builds on the ediﬁce of Basel II by leaving in
place the Basel II risk-weighting regime.
However, Basel III requires regulators to
challenge banks more in the construction of
their models and broadens regulatory authority
under Pillar 2 to require banks to undergo more
frequent and demanding stress tests. The Pillar
2 review also consists of a supervisory review
enhancement process (SREP) that includes
separate assessments of bank capital and
governance. The SREP can be utilised to
forecast the bank’s exposure to systemic risks
and related macro-prudential risks. 
Figure 1: Overview of the ‘3 Pillars’ Framework of Basel III.
Changes implemented in Basel III are highlighted in red.
11 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) ‘Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program (RCAP),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs264.pdf (accessed 14.06.2014)
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a) How does Basel III currently treat systemic
environmental risks?
Pillar 1 of Basel II (now Basel III) does require
banks to assess the impact of speciﬁc
environmental risks on the bank’s credit and
operational risk exposures, but these are mainly
transaction-speciﬁc risks that aﬀected the
borrower’s ability to repay a loan or address the
‘deep pockets’ doctrine of lender liability for
damages and cost of property clean-up. For
example, paragraph 510 of Basel II and III (Pillar
1) requires banks to ‘appropriately monitor the
risk of environmental liability arising in respect
of the collateral, such as the presence of toxic
material on a property’. This would involve the
bank in due diligence and transaction screening
to mitigate the credit and operational risks
associated with this type of lending. These
transaction-speciﬁc risks are narrowly deﬁned
and do not constitute broader macro-prudential
or portfolio-wide risks for the bank. 
b) Do Basel III’s Pillar 1 ‘Minimum Capital
Requirements’ discourage the ﬁnancing of
environmentally sustainable economic
activities?
A concern that has arisen in relation to Pillar 1 of
Basel III is the extent to which higher capital
charges on longer-term project ﬁnance loans
might have had the unintended consequence of
undermining ﬁnance for environmentally
sustainable economic activities, particularly
lending for long-term endeavours such as
infrastructure. Commentators holding this view
argue that unless capital and liquidity
requirements are relaxed, long-term project
ﬁnance for environmentally sustainable
economic activities will be severely restricted.
This study has investigated this concern.
Basel II and III apply a lower risk weighting to
short-term (1-3 year) recourse balance sheet
corporate loans in comparison to longer-term (7
years or more) project ﬁnance loans to oﬀ-
balance-sheet entities because the latter type of
loans are riskier due to their longer maturity and
non-recourse structure. The risk-weighting
framework therefore results in higher capital
requirements for bank lending in countries that
rely mainly on longer-term specialised lending
arrangements as opposed to countries that rely
mainly on short-term corporate loans for such
credit. 
However, the form of bank lending for
environmentally sustainable economic activities
varies substantially between countries. In some
countries (e.g. Brazil and China), this takes place
almost wholly through recourse balance sheet
short-term corporate lending, while in other
countries (e.g. Peru and South Africa), it is
mostly long-term non-recourse oﬀ-balance-
sheet specialised lending (i.e. project ﬁnance).
Across most countries, however, most bank
exposures to ﬁnancing environmentally
sustainable economic activities will be through
short-term corporate lending. A much smaller
percentage of lending will be long-term (7 years
or more), which will mainly be specialised (i.e.
project ﬁnance) lending for large-scale
renewable energy projects.
Do capital requirements matter?
Christopher Wells, Senior Vice President for Environmental and Social Risk for Santander’s
Brazilian subsidiary, explained in an interview for this study that as far as bank risk
management is concerned, managing a bank’s environmental risk exposure in respect of short-
term corporate loans was not a capital allocation issue, as broader governance issues were
implicated and outweighed in importance the calculation of regulatory capital.
In Brazil, a major systemic environmental risk for small and medium-sized farmers is
deforestation of the Amazon and related soil erosion and productivity decline. Most Brazilian
bank lending to mitigate these risks takes the form of recourse balance sheet loans, which are
typically short-term corporate (1-3 years) whilst longer-term maturities are up to 3 to 5 years.
In conclusion, the importance of capital requirements depends on the market context.
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Based on interviews with regulators and bank
practitioners from Brazil, China, India and Peru,
it was uniformly observed that Basel III’s
stricter capital and liquidity requirements
would have only a marginal impact on lending
to support environmentally sustainable activity.
This is not least because bank ﬁnancing of
infrastructure projects, such as those relating
to renewable energy, is inﬂuenced by a
number of factors that relate to the economic
and political riskiness of the project. These
criteria are much more important in
determining whether the bank lends than the
regulatory capital or liquidity requirements. In
fact, regulatory capital is considered by project
ﬁnance specialists to be an insigniﬁcant factor
in inﬂuencing the bank’s pricing of the loan or
its willingness to lend.
Moreover, interviewees stated that lowering
capital and liquidity requirements to beneﬁt
environmentally sustainable economic
activities may create an undesirable trade-oﬀ
between ﬁnancial stability and environmental
sustainability,12 and that Pillar 1’s primary role
should be to support a sound ﬁnancial system
through higher capital and liquidity
requirements. There was also a concern that
lowering capital requirements for the ﬁnancing
of environmentally sustainable economic
activities may lead to arbitrage and poor
incentives for banks.13
Further, the Financial Stability Board (2013) has
observed in a research paper that “The Basel III
reform package does not speciﬁcally target
long-term bank ﬁnance, although it may aﬀect
it…[as Basel III does] alter the incentives for
diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial institutions to
participate in this market.” The FSB further
notes that “pre-crisis models and levels of
ﬁnancing were unsustainable and should not
be the appropriate benchmark for assessing
the impact of reforms on the availability and
cost of longer-term ﬁnance” (FSB 2013). 
Based on the above, the evidence suggests
that regulatory capital and liquidity
requirements as currently set forth in Basel III’s
Pillar 1 approach play at most a marginal role
in inﬂuencing a bank’s decision to provide
specialised lending on project ﬁnance for
environmentally sustainable economic
activities such as renewable energy
infrastructure projects.
c) Are there existing regulatory and market
practices outside of Basel III that are relevant
to this study?
Despite little action at the international level,
some countries have already engaged in a
variety of regulatory and market practices to
assess systemic environmental risks and adopt
practices to mitigate the banking sector’s
exposure to environmentally unsustainable
activity. 
These initiatives have been based on existing
regulatory mandates to promote ﬁnancial
stability by acting through the existing Basel III
framework to identify and manage banking
risks both at the transaction-speciﬁc level and
at the broader portfolio level. What is
signiﬁcant about these various country and
market practices is that the regulatory
approaches used to enhance the bank’s risk
assessment fall into two areas: 1) Greater
interaction between the regulator and the
bank in assessing wider portfolio level ﬁnancial,
social and political risks, and 2) Banks’
enhanced disclosure to the market regarding
their exposures to systemic environmental
risks. Figure 2 highlights countries where
notable innovation is taking place. For a full
review of current regulatory and voluntary
frameworks aiming to promote the
consideration of sustainability issues in banks,
please see Appendix.
12 Interviews with Christopher Wells, Banco Santander Brazil (30 May 2014), Dr Rubens Sardenberg, Brazilian Federation of Banks (17 June 2014) and
Malcolm Athaide, YES Bank (10 July 2014).
13 Interview, Mr Paul Collazos, Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP, (20 May 2014). 
“ Despite little action at the
international level, some
countries have already
engaged in regulatory and
market practices to assess
systemic environmental risk”
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These innovative regulatory approaches and
market practices are often the result of pro-
active policymakers and regulators adjusting
to a changing world. A number of ﬁnancial
development institutions, such as the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) which
currently hosts an informal group of bank
regulators and banking associations called the
Sustainable Banking Network (SBN), have
sought to further promote dialogue between
practitioners and regulators on environmental
sustainability issues and to encourage a better
understanding of these issues by ﬁnancial
regulators. China, Brazil and Peru, among
others, have all embarked on innovative risk
assessment programmes to assess systemic
environmental risks from a macro-prudential
perspective as they recognise the materiality
of systemic environmental risks to banking
stability. 14
China has adopted a more proactive
enforcement approach to promote the
management of systemic environmental risks
by requiring banks to include in their loan
documentation covenants to comply with
environmental standards. Through its 2012
Green Credit Guidelines, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) works towards
promoting bank lending to environmentally
sustainable economic activities such as the
manufacturing of renewable energy
infrastructure and companies that have
developed lower-carbon production processes.
China has multiple long-term environmental
sustainability goals, including a number that
focus on transportation and buildings. Banks
are requested to collect data from these
projects and turn them over to the CBRC,
which in turn is strongly interconnected with
other ministries, including the Environment
Figure 2: Countries with notable examples of initiatives to reﬂect environmental risks in banking
regulation and policy
Legend: 
pink = voluntary frameworks   blue =  ﬁnancial regulation   yellow = other relevant policy & regulation
14 Interview, Ms Rong Zhang, International Finance Corporation (9 May 2014). Ms Zhang explained that the SBN membership has a mission to enhance
the importance of ﬁnancing environmentally sustainable activities in the global ﬁnancial system and to adjust ﬁnancial regulation so that it can
incorporate environmental sustainability objectives in support of their existing ﬁnancial stability objectives.
Sustainable banking policy & regulation
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Ministry which can use the information to
initiate an investigation of environmental
regulation violations. In 2012, the CBRC began
requiring banks to monitor its borrowers’
compliance with environmental regulations
and to begin implementing loan contract
changes that either allows the bank to
accelerate loan repayments of a customer in
violation of environmental laws or else to
demonstrate compliance in a certain
timeframe. If compliance cannot be shown, the
bank could suspend further lending and trigger
accelerated loan repayment. 
In 2014, Brazil adopted similar requirements
relating to the ﬁnancing of sustainable activity,
as well as disclosure, that are mandatory for
banks as part of their Pillar 2 Supervisory
Assessment and Pillar 3 Market Disclosure
requirements. Unlike the supervisory practices
of most other Basel Committee members, the
Banco Central do Brasil (the Central Bank of
Brazil) has utilised the Pillar 2 Internal Capital
Adequacy and Assessment Process (ICAAP) to
encourage banks to assess their individual
exposures to carbon risk. Moreover, the Banco
Central do Brasil implemented a regulation in
2014 15 which establishes guidelines for
ﬁnancial institutions in connection with the
Pillar 2 Supervisory Review and Evaluation
Process (SREP) to consider the bank’s “degree
of exposure to the social and environmental
risk of the activities and transactions of the
institution”. 16 This regulation also requires the
bank to publicly disclose its environmental and
social risks (with penalties if disregarded) as
part of the market discipline disclosure rules of
Pillar 3 of Basel III. 
The Peruvian regulators’ approach has been to
develop the principle of due diligence as the
most eﬀective way to persuade project
managers to rethink how they go about project
development. The due diligence process
requires banks to require the project manager
to complete a due diligence report on the
project, which must be approved by the bank
before it makes credit available. In using this
approach, the regulator is not primarily
imposing pressure on the company over
whether or not to invest in the project, or on
the bank to decide whether or not to make the
loan. Instead, the company is required to more
deeply analyse the underlying social,
environmental and economic risks related to
the loan, and to recognise these before they
manifest during project development. Long
before substantial amounts are invested, the
developer is asked to assess the risk factors –
social, environmental, economic and ﬁnancial –
relevant for planning, building and operating
the project. The bank oversees this assessment
in order to determine at a deeper level the
riskiness of the loan and the extent to which it
should provide credit for the project. 
According to senior management at Peru’s
Financial Regulation Authority, since this
innovation was introduced, social conﬂicts
have decreased markedly and aﬀected
stakeholders and community groups feel they
now have more inﬂuence in shaping the
investment decision. This has also resulted in
improved ﬁnancial risk management for banks,
as defaults and restructurings on such loans
have fallen dramatically. 17 This has enhanced
banks’ ﬁnancial risk management and also
improved broader macro-economic
development for communities and the country
as a whole. Based on such due diligence risk
assessments, banks can obtain more
information and can therefore act sooner and
more eﬀectively in managing their own risk by,
for example, requiring higher quality collateral
and sensitising the manager to potential social
unrest because of the project and its related
systemic environmental risks.
d) How might the Basel Committee take
forward the lessons of this study?
The evidence assessed during this study
suggests that systemic environmental risks are
material to banking stability. The study has
found that the existing Basel Capital Accord
does require banks to assess the impact of
speciﬁc environmental risks on the bank’s
credit and operational risk exposures, but that
these transaction-speciﬁc risks are narrowly
deﬁned and do not constitute broader macro-
prudential or portfolio-wide risks for the bank.
15 Regulation No. 4,327 (28 April 2014).
16 Ibid. 
17 Interview, Dr Daniel Schydlowsky, Director Peru’s Financial Regulation Authority, and Paul Collazos, Economist, Peru’s Financial Regulation Authority
(4 June2014). 
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The impact of Basel III’s Pillar 1 Minimum
Capital Requirements was explored with the
conclusion that regulatory capital and liquidity
requirements, as currently set forth in Basel
III’s Pillar 1, play at most a marginal role in
inﬂuencing a bank’s decision to provide
specialised lending on project ﬁnance for
environmentally sustainable economic
activities. In addition, it is thought that
lowering capital and liquidity requirements to
beneﬁt environmentally sustainable economic
activities may create an undesirable trade-oﬀ
between ﬁnancial stability and environmental
sustainability.
How, then, might the Basel Committee
improve the banking sector’s management of
systemic environmental risks in keeping with its
responsibility to safeguard banking sector
stability and sustainability? Supervisory Review
under Pillar 2 and Market Discipline under
Pillar 3 oﬀer some promising avenues.
Using Pillar 2 – Supervisory Review
The Pillar 2 Supervisory Review process is
designed to complement Pillar 1 and concerns
risk management. Risk management is about
diversiﬁcation of risk exposures by reducing,
for instance, concentration risk exposures to
certain asset classes or economic sectors. 
Pillar 2 of Basel III requires banks to measure
and manage risks at the broader portfolio level
by applying the “fundamental principles of
sound capital assessment”, including “policies
and procedures designed to ensure that the
bank identiﬁes, measures, and reports all
material risks” (i.e. stress tests) across its
portfolio. 18 Pillar 2 allows the supervisors to
have wide powers of oversight to test the
bank’s corporate governance structures and its
risk management practices in assessing
transaction-speciﬁc risks as well as broader
portfolio-level risks. Based on these
assessments, modiﬁcations can be made to the
Pillar 1 capital and liquidity calculation
processes. 
Banks should address all ‘material’ risks in the
capital assessment process and, while it is
recognised that not all risks can be measured
precisely, the process should be developed to
estimate risks by making a list of risk exposures
that should “by no means constitute a
comprehensive list of all risks”. 19 This study
argues that exposure to economic activity that
is environmentally unsustainable falls within
the scope of Pillar 2. 
To be incorporated in the Pillar 2 portfolio risk
assessment framework, risks must be
considered ‘material’ and included in the
bank’s list of material risks. However, the Basel
Committee has not been addressing systemic
environmental risks, nor has it been
encouraging national regulators to ask bank
risk oﬃcers whether they are measuring the
bank’s exposure to environmentally
unsustainable activities. For example, most
bank supervisors have not utilised Pillar 2’s
supervisory approaches to incorporate
forward-looking models that estimate the
potential stability impact of supplying credit to
environmentally unsustainable or sustainable
activities over time into their stress tests. Such
an approach could equally be applied to
recognise the positive impact of bank lending
for environmentally sustainably activity as the
negative impact for environmentally
unsustainable activity. 
This very limited approach to addressing
banking risks that can arise from
environmentally unsustainable activity could
pose serious longer-term risks to the stability
of the banking sector. It is an omission that is
unsupported by the economic and scientiﬁc
data and that is within the mandate of the
Basel Committee to address. Recent studies
show that the cost of environmentally
unsustainable activity to the economy is
becoming increasingly material in terms of
ﬁnancial risk exposure for banking institutions.
The World Bank estimates that the average
annual economic cost of human-induced
environmental depletion was approximately
$6.6 trillion in 2008, equivalent to 11 per cent
of global GDP. The same study estimates that if
environmentally unsustainable activity
continues at this scale, the annual costs for the
global economy will reach nearly $28.6 trillion
by 2050, equivalent to 18 per cent of global
GDP (UNEP FI 2011). 
18 Basel II Pillar 2, para 731.
19 Basel II Pillar 2, para 732. 
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The evidence therefore suggests that systemic
environmental risks are material for bank
regulation purposes and therefore should be
expressly incorporated into Pillar 2’s list of
material risks. This would provide an
internationally level playing ﬁeld to guide bank
risk oﬃcers and regulators in assessing the
portfolio-level risks of bank lending for
environmentally sustainable and unsustainable
activities. This could potentially involve
regulators and risk oﬃcers developing, among
other things, exclusion lists, phase-out or phase-
in targets for certain types of activities (e.g.
replace high-carbon assets with low-carbon
assets), and conduct impact screening – both
negative and positive – to develop a better
understanding of banks’ risk exposure to
environmentally unsustainable activity.
Using Pillar 3 – Market Discipline
The Pillar 3 ─ Market Discipline – element of
Basel III could also play an important role in
enhancing risk management in respect of
systemic environmental risks. It largely relies on
developing a set of disclosure requirements
which will allow market participants to assess
relevant information about a bank’s capital, risk
exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence
the capital adequacy of the institution. By
providing disclosures to the capital markets, it is
intended that investors should learn fully of the
risks to which banking institutions are exposed –
including the bank’s exposure to systemic
environmental risks. 
Public disclosure of these risks raises a number
of questions. Firstly, whether or not the public is
able to comprehend the long-term eﬀects of
their investment choices. Regulators in both
Brazil and Peru doubt the willingness of the
individual investor to question the long-term risk
exposure to carbon and other systemic
environmental risks of a short-term investment,
or to diﬀerentiate between a stock doing badly
due to its exposure to environmentally
sustainable or unsustainable activity as
compared to other bad business choices. Peru’s
bank regulator also questioned the usefulness of
requiring banks to disclose publicly their
exposure to systemic environmental risks on the
grounds that this could expose banks to
potential legal liability for mis-stating such risks
in their disclosures. Secondly, the eﬀectiveness
of these kinds of disclosures was questioned
based on the availability of data and related
information, and the diﬃculty of forecasting
systemic environmental risk exposures far into
the future. 
That said, the market discipline approach has
been utilised by shareholders of some US
banks to require the bank’s board to disclose
the institution’s exposure to high-carbon
activities. This has been criticised as a rather
ad hoc and inﬂexible approach to obtaining
information on a bank’s carbon exposure. 20
Instead, our ﬁndings suggest that the market
discipline approach in Pillar 3 could be
enhanced to include rules on both qualitative
disclosures (e.g. voluntary codes and industry
standards) and quantitative disclosures (as
deﬁned by the ﬁnancial regulator). This would
provide an eﬀective and a more economically
eﬃcient tool which would also improve
accountability through further clarifying the
ﬁduciary duties of the bank board to
undertake risk assessments to obtain this
information. 21
Pillar 3’s market discipline framework should be
considered as another lever to enhance the
banks’ governance frameworks with respect to
systemic environmental risks. Basel III, however,
does not require or encourage banks to disclose
information about systemic environmental risks
or risk management practices. In some
countries, such as France, 22 all environmental
and social risk exposures must be publicly
disclosed by listed companies and ﬁnancial
institutions. The Basel Committee should
consider how Pillar 3 can be used to encourage
or require banks to disclose, on a harmonised
and standardised basis, information about
exposure to systemic environmental risks and
consequent management practices that could
be useful for investors in assessing the bank’s
longer-term soundness and proﬁtability.
20 According to a recent WSJ report, shareholder resolutions have become increasingly political and less relevant to average shareholders with respect
to climate risk reporting, as ‘special-interest groups’ have allegedly hijacked the shareholder resolution process, as the guidance (on disclosing
emissions stemming from fossil-fuel related loans) released by regulators has not led to an increase in the quality or quantity of the disclosures.
21 What exactly could amount to a breach of ﬁduciary duty is, in itself, a widely contested area. Trustees who do not act on Environmental and Social
Governance issues arguably increase the risk of a long-term portfolio and therefore may not be acting in the best interest of the beneﬁciaries. The
problem is that, in practice, various ﬁnancial managers believe that considering issues other than ﬁnancial returns could constitute a breach. The
ﬁndings of a UNEP FI legal study issued in 2005 (A legal framework for the integration of environmental, social and governance issues into
institutional investment, UNEP FI, 2005), found that ﬁduciary duty is inclusive rather than exclusive of environmental, social and governance
considerations, however diﬀerences of opinion persist in the market as regulation continues to be permissive rather than obligatory.
22 France has adopted legislation mandating banking and ﬁnancial institutions to publicly disclose their environmental and social risks as they relate to
the company’s ﬁnancial performance and soundness. See Conseil d’Etat Decree, Regulation, Article 225. The disclosure of social and environmental
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Evolving bank capital and governance frameworks to include systemic environmental risks may
ultimately lead regulators and banks to agree on diﬀerent risk weightings for certain activities
depending on their classiﬁcation as environmentally sustainable or unsustainable. This could
potentially result in diﬀerent capital and liquidity requirements under Pillar 1 for activities
depending on whether they are classiﬁed as environmentally ‘sustainable’ (lower
requirements) or ‘unsustainable’ (higher requirements). 
Properly incorporating systemic environmental risk issues as suggested in this report will of
course raise challenges. In the ﬁrst instance, there would be a need to do suﬃcient data
collection, analysis and modelling to estimate the ﬁnancial stability risks associated with
environmentally sustainable and unsustainable activity. These issues should be considered by
ﬁnancial policymakers and the Basel Committee, and further studied by central banks,
regulators, bank risk oﬃcers, and researchers in institutes and universities.
Figure 3: Areas of Basel III on which this study suggests the Basel Committee should focus –
highlighted in orange (areas in green indicate existing coverage) 
The management of certain
transaction -speciﬁc
environmental risks on
credit and operational risks
is already required by
paragraph 510
ICAAP and SREP can
be used to assess
portfolio risk
exposures to systemic
environmental risks
Standardised or
harmonised disclosure of
information about exposure
to, and management of,
systemic environmental
risks could form part of
additional or enhanced
disclosure requirements
Looking ahead
Figure 3 illustrates where this study suggests the Basel Committee should focus if Basel III is to
adequately address systemic environmental risks.
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What other ﬁnancial policy options are available?4 Part 2 of this study has considered how Basel
III could adequately take account of systemic
environmental risks. However, there are other
ﬁnancial policy options available to
policymakers and regulators, which are also
worth exploring.
a) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy could play a role in
supporting liquidity provision for ﬁnance to
support environmentally sustainable
economic activities. 
In recent history, central bank monetary
policy has revolved around the targeting of
retail price inﬂation at a low rate of around 2
per cent and using an array of measures to
ensure that the target is achieved and that
the monetary policy transmission mechanism
works eﬀectively throughout the economy
and banking system. The economic slowdown
in Europe, the US and Japan in the aftermath
of the ﬁnancial crisis has led the world’s most
inﬂuential central banks – the US Federal
Reserve, the European Central Bank, the
Japanese Central Bank, and the Bank of
England – to follow extraordinarily loose
monetary policies involving quantitative
easing and generous liquidity and other
ﬁnancial support for the banking sector with a
view to encouraging banks to lend more to
the broader economy. 
For example, between 2009 and 2014, the
Bank of England followed a ‘funding for
lending’ scheme that involved the British
central bank lending money at a zero-interest
rate to banks with the hope that the banks
would then lend the funds on to homebuyers
to support the British housing market. Banks
were not obliged to lend the money, but were
obliged to report the amount of funds they
provided for home mortgage loans. 
Experts are divided over the eﬀectiveness of
the policy. In the context of this report,
however, it raises the question of whether
central banks should make funding available
to banks on generous terms in order to
promote lending to environmentally
sustainable economic activities. An example
of this has been demonstrated by the
Lebanese Central Bank through its Decree
number 7835 to support ﬁnancing for
investment in environmentally sustainable
projects, including green buildings and
renewable energy projects.
Brazilian and Peruvian authorities and bankers
explained that their central banks are very
conservative and would probably not agree to
the use of loose monetary policy measures to
increase such lending because it might send a
signal to the global capital markets that they
were following an undisciplined monetary
policy that could lead to higher inﬂation. They
further asserted that monetary policy
conditions in most emerging-market
economies were not greatly aﬀected by the
recent ﬁnancial crisis and monetary policy
should therefore remain conservative and
orthodox. 
That said, Dr Rubens Sardenberg, Chief
Economist of the Brazilian Federation of
Banks, expressed the personal view that he
thought there were ways that central banks
could facilitate ﬁnancial support for lending to
environmentally sustainable economic
activities, These could involve, for example,
the central bank accepting ‘green bonds’ or
asset-backed securities that were AAA rated
as collateral for liquidity support . Dr
Sardenberg also emphasised that Brazilian
banks are largely well-capitalised and
ﬁnanced at this time and would not need
such liquidity support from central banks to
provide more lending to environmentally
sustainable economic activities. 
In contrast, Mr Han Fe of the CBRC stated
that, because of recent banking stresses in
2013 in the inter-bank loan market, the
Chinese central bank (the People’s Bank of
China – PBOC) was considering more
proactive measures to provide additional
liquidity support to Chinese banks, such as
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the acceptance of ‘green’ asset-backed
securities as collateral for liquidity support for
Chinese banks. 
b) Financial innovation 
Financial innovation could play a further
important role in identifying sources of
ﬁnance for bank lending to support
environmentally sustainable economic
activity. 
Chinese regulators are already acting in
accordance with this view. Because China’s
capital markets are evolving and becoming
more sophisticated, credit risk transfer
instruments, such as asset-backed securities,
are increasingly viewed by regulators and
bankers as potential sources of additional
ﬁnance for the Chinese economy. This could
perhaps play an important role in allowing
Chinese banks to make more funding
available for initiatives that target
environmentally sustainable economic
activity. 
This view was supported by Dr Sardenberg,
who emphasised how fast the Brazilian
wholesale debt and secondary trading
markets are evolving and the growing interest
by banks in utilising credit risk transfer
instruments that are subject to regulatory
controls to attract more investment in ‘green
credit’. He observed that the Brazilian market
was not quite ready for these instruments yet,
but when the time comes there will be a quick
transition because Brazil has already been
through a painful regulatory reform of its
banking sector in the 1990s after a crisis that
resulted in the Banco Central do Brasil
obtaining broad macro-prudential supervisory
powers to control and monitor the so-called
‘shadow banking’ sector. Therefore, any new
ﬁnancing instruments or ABS green assets
would be subject to central bank oversight. 
As discussed above, the involvement of
central bank oversight may not be a bad thing
as demonstrated in the case of the Chinese
authorities considering the merits of allowing
the PBOC to accept certain simple and
transparent green asset-backed securities
(ABS) as collateral for bank liquidity support
measures. This could potentially lead to much
greater bank lending for environmentally
sustainable economic activities and provide
more sustainable sources of funding for such
initiatives. 
Even without central bank acceptance of
green ABS as collateral, however, Chinese
regulators are considering more favourable
regulatory treatment to be applied to certain
innovative ﬁnancial instruments, such as
green asset-backed securities. Under
consideration are proposals that would allow
companies to issue ‘green bonds’ and for
banks to securitise ‘green assets’ as a way to
generate more funding for environmentally
sustainable economic activity. The CBRC
considers simple and transparent asset-
backed securities as an important source of
ﬁnance for such economic activity. Moreover,
the CBRC hopes that the Chinese central bank
will approve the use of certain monetary
policy tools to increase green lending, such as
the central bank accepting green bonds or
high quality asset-backed securities as
collateral for providing liquidity support to
banks.
In addition, the growing sophistication of
China’s wholesale securities and debt markets
creates the potential for increased investment
in green assets by institutional investors along
with the creation of a secondary market for
trading these securities. All of which would
bode well for increased investment into
Chinese green credit.
c) Joining up banking regulation with
environmental policy 
A major weakness with existing approaches to
ﬁnancial and environmental policy and
regulation has been lack of coordination in
developing, implementing and enforcing rules
and standards. The problem of a lack of
coordination and mutual recognition of
standards arises all the way to the
international level, involving the G20 and
international environmental initiatives. There
has been a failure of policymakers at the
highest level to join up ﬁnancial policy and
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environmental policy with respect to putting
the global economy on a more stable and
sustainable footing. For instance, many bank
supervisors do not believe that they have a
policy mandate from their Finance Ministries
to require banks and ﬁnancial institutions to
manage or report their systemic
environmental risks. 
Although the G20 has failed to recognise the
importance of the linkage between ﬁnancial
policy and environmental policy, some
countries have made much progress in
establishing institutional and legal linkages
between environmental and ﬁnancial
regulation.
The eﬀorts of China and Peru should be
noted, as they have adopted coordination
mechanisms between environmental and
ﬁnance ministries and banking regulators to
ensure the exchange of information, data and
mutual support in the investigation and
enforcement of environmental laws. Both the
bank and environmental regulator are
required to coordinate their regulatory
practices and supervision where
environmental regulatory compliance and
ﬁnancial regulatory compliance implicate one
another. Other countries, such as Brazil, have
embarked on similar coordination policies by
ensuring that databases of infringements of
environmental laws and regulations are made
publicly available, enabling banks to access
them. 
Most advanced developed countries, however
– including most members of the Basel
Committee – have no policy to coordinate
environmental and banking regulation.
Moreover, in EU states and the United States
bank regulators and supervisors do not have
an oﬃcial mandate to take account of
systemic environmental risks when applying
and implementing their own regulatory
frameworks. 
Many central banks in the Sustainable
Banking Network have developed national
approaches that could serve as a model for
the G20 and other international bodies to
recommend to all countries although, of
course, country-speciﬁc approaches may not
be wholly transferable. Successful approaches
generally involve countries developing a
strong dialogue between their environmental
and the ﬁnancial ministries with respect to
ﬁnancial exposures to systemic environmental
risk. It is certainly necessary as a ﬁrst step for
ﬁnance ministries to provide bank regulators
with a mandate to supervise the banking
sector’s exposure to systemic environmental
risks. This will ultimately enhance bank risk
management in the areas of credit, market,
liquidity and operational risk.
“ Most advanced, developed
countries – including
members of the Basel
Committee – have no policy
to coordinate environmental
and banking regulation”
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Conclusions and recommendations for ﬁnancial
policymakers and regulators5
The role of the ﬁnancial system in the
economy and broader society is to provide
the necessary ﬁnancing and liquidity for
human and economic activity to thrive – not
only today, but also tomorrow. In other
words, its role is to fund a stable and
sustainable economy. The role of ﬁnancial
regulators is to ensure that excessive risks
that would threaten the stability of the
ﬁnancial system – and hence imperil the
stability and sustainability of the economy –
are not taken.
The analysis presented in this report suggests
that the regulatory framework that governs
today’s banking system may not be being used to
its full capacity; with some notable exceptions,
systemic environmental risks appear to be in the
collective blind spot of bank supervisors. 
Despite the fact that history demonstrates direct
and indirect links between systemic
environmental risks and banking sector stability,
and that evidence suggests this trend will
become more pronounced and complex as
humanity breaches more planetary boundaries,
the current Basel Capital Accord does not take
explicit account of, and therefore only marginally
addresses, these issues. Although Basel III
provides a ﬂexible framework for regulators
and bank risk management to assess and
measure the ﬁnancial stability risks associated
with environmental risks, this has not been
utilised by most bank regulators in their
supervisory frameworks.
By failing to addresses systemic environmental
risks, Basel III is arguably overlooking an
important source of risk to the ﬁnancial system
and broader economy, despite its overriding
objective of guaranteeing banking stability and
sustainability. Because ﬁnancial stability is a
public good, regulation has a role to play to
ensure that environmental risks do not threaten
ﬁnancial stability.
However this report also oﬀers insights that
solutions are within reach, should regulators and
industry practitioners work together proactively.
A number of national authorities, especially in
emerging markets, are already acting to use
the existing regulatory framework to address
these links. Opportunities exist within the
current Basel Capital Accord to learn from
these practices and to raise the standard of
how systemic environmental risks are managed
internationally. This report suggests a roadmap
for how Basel III can be used to begin assessing
and measuring the systemic environmental
risks that have material impact on banking
stability and which can assist banks in
diversifying their risk exposures to more
environmentally sustainable economic
activities. 
Additional options relating to monetary policy
and measures to increase the potential for
long-term investors to allocate capital to
environmentally sustainable activities are also
available to regulators. On this basis, a number
of recommendations are oﬀered overleaf. 
“ Opportunities exist within the
current Basel Capital Accord
[…] to raise the standard of
how systemic environmental
risks are managed
internationally”
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Recommendations
1. The Basel Committee should explicitly
acknowledge environmental risks and their
increasing impact on the stability and
sustainability of the economy as an emerging
source of systemic risk for banks and banking
stability. On this basis it should encourage
and support bank regulators to work with
banks to adopt current best practice in the
management of environmental issues, and to
collect the necessary data and conduct
analysis to reﬁne the banking sectors'
understanding of, and ability to address,
systemic environmental risk in the future.
2. Bank supervisors should then explore the
feasibility of incorporating forward-looking
scenarios that estimate the potential
ﬁnancial stability impact of supplying credit
to environmentally sustainable or
unsustainable activities over time into their
Pillar 2 – Supervisory Review stress tests
3.  Bank supervisors should also examine Pillar 3
– Market Discipline to assess the feasibility
of banks disclosing information about their
exposure to, and management of, systemic
environmental risks in a standardised
manner across countries. It is important that
such disclosures be comparable across banks
and jurisdictions. The Basel Committee
should determine its role in creating an
internationally level playing ﬁeld. 
4.  Meanwhile, national ﬁnancial authorities
should consider their role in developing
targeted monetary policy measures that
would assist banks in providing more funding
for green lending. For instance, central banks
could consider whether to accept certain
high quality green assets as collateral for
central bank loans to banks. 
5.  As ﬁnancial regulators are assessing
standards and rules that allow banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions to use simple
and transparent ﬁnancial instruments and
investment structures to facilitate longer-
term investment, they should aim to
encourage more investment in 'green’
assets and other forms of
environmentally sustainable economic
activity. For instance, sustainable asset-
backed securities issued in transparent
and simple structures could increase long-
term investment in ‘green’ credit and
related assets. 
6.  Finally, far greater eﬀort must be made to
ensure that ﬁnancial and environmental
policies and regulations are coordinated
across government agencies and
departments in their promulgation,
implementation and enforcement.
Next steps
These ﬁndings and recommendations clearly
have profound implications. Further research
is necessary to assess the feasibility of their
implementation. This should happen on a
multi-disciplinary and international basis, and
should include continuing to learn lessons
from those national authorities that have
already taken leadership steps and working
with market actors to establish the most
appropriate roles for them to play.
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A growing number of scientists think we have
entered a new geological epoch that needs a new
name — the Anthropocene – to reﬂect the rapid
expansion of human activities since the industrial
revolution, which has now generated a global
geophysical force equivalent to some of the great
forces of nature. They have been seeking to
characterise the conditions needed for our planet
to continue in a stable, Holocene-like state — the
state of the Earth over the past ~10,000 years in
which human civilizations have thrived.
In 2009, a group of 28 internationally renowned
scientists identiﬁed and quantiﬁed a set of nine
planetary boundaries within which they argued
humanity can continue to develop and thrive for
generations to come. In their paper published in
the journal, Nature (461, 472-475, 24 September
2009), they argued that “[t]ransgressing one or
more planetary boundaries may be deleterious
or even catastrophic due to the risk of crossing
thresholds that will trigger non-linear, abrupt
environmental change within continental- to
planetary-scale systems.” They contended that
respecting planetary boundaries reduces the
risks to human society of crossing these
thresholds.
This diagram, taken from their Nature paper,
presents these nine planetary boundaries. The
inner green shading represents the proposed
safe operating space for nine planetary
systems. The red wedges represent an
estimate of the current position for each
variable. The boundaries in three systems
(rate of biodiversity loss, climate change and
human interference with the nitrogen cycle),
have already been exceeded.
Appendix A - Planetary boundaries explained
Azote Images/Stockholm
Resilience Centre
Figure 4: The nine planetary boundaries
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Appendix B - Overview of current frameworks to
include environmental risks in banking
Country Date Name of
Framework 
(& sub-parts) 
Type of 
Framework
Scope Main stakeholders 
involved in development 
of guidance
Targeted 
Constituency
Responsibility
for implementation 
AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST
Kenya 2014 Kenya Sustainable
Banking Principles
Voluntary
guidelines
TBD - Kenyan Banking
Association 
- A Working Group of
commercial banks
Commercial banks N/A
Lebanon 2011 Decree nr. 7835 
on central bank
reserve
requirements
Incentives
embedded in
central bank
regulation
Loans ﬁnancing energy
eﬃciency and renewable
energy projects 
- Central Bank of Lebanon
(Banque du Liban/BdL) as
part of Lebanon’s national
economic and
development plan
Commercial banks Central Bank of Lebanon
Source: UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), 2014. The information below is partly based on
information released by Environment, Social and Governance Department of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC). UNEP FI would like to thank the IFC for its kind contribution.
Other countries where practitioners and/or regulators are signiﬁcantly* engaged on sustainability issues: Morocco.
South
Africa
-1994
-2002
-2009
- King Code of
Governance I
- King Code of
Governance II
- King Code of
Governance III
Voluntary Guidelines,
now partially
integrated into law
(e.g. the Companies
Act of South Africa, the
Public Finance
Management Act, and
the Promotion of
Access to Information
Act
- Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance
& Sustainability
- Corporate Citizenship,
Sustainability &
Leadership
King Committee on
Corporate Governance
(formed upon a request of
the Institute of Directors of
Southern Africa)
- Listed companies and
large public entities,
including banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions.
- Listed companies and a
variety of public entities,
including banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions.
- All Public, Private and
non-proﬁt institutions
N/A
Banks, discount houses
and development ﬁnance
institutions
- Adviser on Sustainability
(recruited from MOE) at
CBN
- Deputy Director of the
Policy and Regulation
Department (CBN)
- Sustainability Committee
comprising members of 13
departments of the CBN
- Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) 
- Nigeria Bankers
Committee
- Commercial banks 
- Environmental &
Social Risk
Management
Quasi mandatory
regulation
Nigerian Sustainable
Banking Principles
and Guidance Note,
including 3 Sector-
Speciﬁc Guidelines
2012Nigeria
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ASIA-PACIFIC
Bangladesh 2011 Environmental Risk
Management
Guidelines for Banks
and Financial
Institutions in
Bangladesh
Mandatory 
regulation
- Environmental & Social
Risk Management
- Bangladesh Bank (BB)
- Commercial banks
Banks and Financial
Organizations under the
Financial Institutions Act
(former Non-Bank FIs)
- Supervision department
of BB
- Since 2013: newly
established Green 
Banking and CSR
Department of BB
India 2014 Companies Act
2013
Mandatory
regulation
(amendment
to Companies
Act 1956)
Investments in CSR
activities (including
environmental
sustainability)
Enacted by the Parliament
of India
All large Indian corporations Ministry of Corporate
Aﬀairs
Commercial banks N/AIssued by the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) following
consultations with Public
and private sector banks
- Triple bottom- line
Reporting
- Resource management
- Corporate Social
Responsibility
Non mandatory“Corporate Social
Responsibility,
Sustainable
Development and
Non-Financial
Reporting – Role of
Banks” 
2007India
China 2007
2012
- Green Credit
Policy (GCP)
- Green Credit
Guideline (GCG)
Mandatory
regulation
GCG
- Environmental & Social
Risk Management
- Internal Management and
management structure
- Information disclosure
GCP
- Ministry of Environmental
Protection
- China Banking Regulatory
Commission 
- People's Bank of China
 
GCG
- China Banking
Regulatory Commission
Policy banks, state-owned
commercial banks, joint-
stock commercial banks,
ﬁnancial assets
management companies,
Postal Savings Bank of China,
provincial rural credit
unions; all trust ﬁrms,
enterprise group ﬁnance
companies and ﬁnancial
leasing ﬁrms directly
regulated by the CBRC
GCP
- N/A
GCG: 
- Statistics and Research
Departments of the
CBRC
Indonesia 2014 Green Banking
Regulation
TBD TBD - Bank Indonesia
- Ministry of the
Environment
All Indonesian banks Banking supervisory
agency (OJK)
Vietnam 2014 Environmental and
Social Risk
Management
Circular
Mandatory
regulation
Environmental & Social
Risk Management
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) All Vietnamese banks State Bank of Vietnam
(SBV)
- Mongolian Banking
Association
- 14 leading commercial
banks in Mongolia
N/AEnvironmental & Social Risk
Management
To be completedVoluntary
guidelines 
Sustainable
Banking Principles
2014Mongolia
Japan 2011 Principles for
Financial Action
towards a
Sustainable Society
Voluntary
guidelines
- Environmental and
Social risk management 
- Information disclosure
- Supporting SMEs,
society’s environmental
performance and
disaster readiness
- Ministry of Environment
- All Japanese ﬁnancial
institutions
All Japanese ﬁnancial
institutions
N/A
Other countries where practitioners and/or regulators are signiﬁcantly* engaged on sustainability issues: Laos, Philippines, Thailand.
Country Date Name of
Framework 
(& sub-parts) 
Type of 
Framework
Scope Main stakeholders 
involved in development 
of guidance
Targeted 
Constituency
Responsibility
for implementation 
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2002 NRE implementing
Decree; and
Ministerial Order
Mandatory
Regulation
Reporting according to a
list of 19 environmental
and social topics; and
emissions and pollution
State Council Companies whose securities
can be traded on a
regulated market 
EUROPE
2003 Directive on annual
and consolidated
accounts of certain
types of
companies, banks
and other ﬁnancial
institutions and
insurance
undertakings
Mandatory for
EU states to
transpose in
national
legislation
Reporting: states that it
should not be restricted to
the ﬁnancial aspects of the
company's business, but,
where appropriate, include
analysis of environmental
and social aspects
European Parliament and
Council (proposed by
Commission)
Most credit institutions and
other ﬁnancial institutions
EU States, but under the
directive they might choose
to waive the obligation to
provide non-ﬁnancial
information.Overseen by
DG Internal Market
2012 Energy Eﬃciency
Directive 
Mandatory for
EU states to
transpose in
national
legislation
Countries are required to
use energy more eﬃciently
at all stages of the energy
chain
European Parliament and
Council (proposed by
Commission)
Indirectly, all private
companies, through
implementation of
countries measures to
comply with the Directive
EU States. Overseen by
DG Energy
All businesses EU States, invited to
develop / update by mid
2012 national action
plans to promote CSR.
Overseen by DG
Enterprise and Industry
European Commission
communication to European
Parliament, Council,
Economic and Social
Committee and Committee
of the Regions
Promoting CSR in the EU
space
Recommendations
for States;
guidance
EU Strategy for
CSR 2011-2014 
2011
2004 Environmental
Liability Directive
Mandatory
for EU states
to transpose
in national
legislation
Prevention and remedying
of environmental (species,
natural habitats, water and
soil) damage – enacting the
‘polluter pays’ principle.
European Parliament and
Council (proposed by
Commission)
All businesses EU States. Overseen by
DG Environment
2014 Directive on
disclosure of 
non-ﬁnancial 
and diversity
information by
certain large
companies 
and groups
Mandatory for
EU states to
transpose in
national
legislation
Disclosure on policies, risks
and outcomes as regards
environmental matters,
social and employee-
related aspects, respect for
human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery
issues, and diversity in their
board of directors
European Parliament and
Council (proposed by
Commission)
Large public-interest entities
with more than 500
employees (includes listed as
well as some unlisted
companies, such as banks,
designated by Member States
because of their activities,
size or number of employees)
EU States. Overseen by DG
Internal Market and
Services
2014 Communication on
long term ﬁnancing
of the European
economy
Proposal to lead
to mandatory
requirements
Proposal to lead to
legislation on how to
mobilize long-term ﬁnancing
for the European economy,
including mobilizing private
sources of long-term
ﬁnancing and enhancing the
wider framework for
sustainable ﬁnance
European Commission
communication to European
Parliament and the Council
Private and public sectors
(including banks as a
speciﬁc target)
Potentially EU states. 
Overseen by DG Internal
Market and Services
Country Date Name of
Framework 
(& sub-parts) 
Type of 
Framework
Scope Main stakeholders 
involved in development 
of guidance
Targeted 
Constituency
Responsibility
for implementation 
France
EU
2001 New Economic
Regulations Act
(NRE)
Mandatory
Regulation
Requirement to disclose in
annual report the way
companies address the social
and environmental impacts
Voted by Parliament Companies whose securities
can be traded on a regulated
market
Various Ministries, in
matters that concern them
2010 Grenelle II Act,
followed by Decree
regarding
sustainability
reporting
requirements
Mandatory
Regulation
Corporate sustainability
reporting; requirement to
disclose certain
environmental and social
information and information
relating to sustainable
development commitments;
or provide substantive
information on why certain
data is not reported
Voted by Parliament
Further to nationwide
multi-stakeholder dialogue
on sustainable
development 
All listed companies and
companies with an annual
balance and turnover of 100
million Euros and an average
of 500 permanent employees
Ministry for Ecology,
Sustainable Development 
and Energy, multi-
stakeholder consultations
2013 Preparation
National Plan for
the Development
of CSR 
Action plan for
implementation
of EU CSR
strategy 
2011-2014
Embed CSR issues in French
corporate sector, including
responsible ﬁnance in
support of the ecological
transition, basic rights and
competitiveness 
Ministry for Ecology,
Sustainable Development
and Energy, multi-
stakeholder consultations
Private and public sector;
ﬁnancial sector to be
speciﬁcally mentioned
Ministry for Ecology,
Sustainable Development
and Energy, multi-
stakeholder consultations
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2006 Companies
Act
Mandatory Requirements to report
on environmental,
workplace, social, and
community matters that
are material to their
business 
Parliament Companies listed in the
London Stock Exchange 
Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills
2010 CRC Energy
Eﬃciency Scheme
Order (amendment
in 2013)
Mandatory Report emissions related
to energy use
Environment Agency
Department for
Environment Food & Rural
Aﬀairs
Companies that use more
than 6,000MWh per year
Environment Agency
2012 Combined Code
on Corporate
Governance 
Guiding principles;
contains Listing Rules,
requiring listed
companies to apply
and report on main
principles; voluntary
for wider private
sector 
Corporate Governance The Financial Reporting
Council (FRC)
Listed companies Financial Reporting Council
Listed companies Secretary of State for
Energy and Climate
Change Committee on
Climate Change
Parliament (upon
recommendation of the
Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution)
Report CO2 emissions
on an annual basis
Mandatory Climate
Change Act
2008
2008 Amendment of
The Danish
Financial
Statements Act
(2001) to include
accounting for CSR
in large businesses
Mandatory
Regulation
Requirement to report on
CSR policies and how
policies are translated into
action, or expressly state
that the company will not
be engaging in CSR 
Voted by Parliament State owned companies and
companies with total assets of
more than EUR 19 million,
revenues more than EUR 38
million and more than 250
employees. xtended also to
listed ﬁnancial businesses not
covered by the Danish
Financial Statements Act by
the Danish Financial
Supervisory 
Authority
Danish Business Authority
2012 New amendment
of Danish Financial
Statements Act to
include human
rights and climate
change issues
Mandatory
Regulation
Danish companies have to
also speciﬁcally
address human rights and
climate change
EUROPE
1996 National White
Paper on CSR
Action plan /
voluntary
Placed CSR in the context
of competitiveness of
Norwegian business in the
global Economy
Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs
Open to all stakeholders
Wide business community,
among other stakeholders
The Danish Business
Authority
Danish Business
Authority
Businesses - integrate CSR
in their core business;
investors - use their
investments as a driving
force for sustainable
growth
Guidelines,
comprising voluntary
and mandatory
measures
Government
Action Plan for
Corporate Social
Responsibility
2012-2015 
2011
1998 Accounting Act Mandatory Requirement to include
sustainability-related 
topics in company Director’s
report, such as work place
environment, 
gender equality and
environmental issues
All Norwegian-registered
companies
2013 Extension of the
Accounting Act on
CSR reporting
Mandatory Disclosure on integration of
considerations for human
rights, labor rights and social
issues, the environment and
anti-corruption in business
strategies, daily operations,
and their relations with their
stakeholders
Voted by Parliament,
further to proposal from
Ministry of Finance
Large companies Ministry 
of Finance to adopt
implementing and
transitional measures
Other countries where practitioners and/or regulators are signiﬁcantly* engaged on sustainability issues:
- Government-led, mostly focused on CSR Reporting: Austria (2003), Netherlands (2005), Sweden (2007), Finland (2011),
Germany (2011), Spain (2011)
- Industry-led: Greece, Switzerland, Turkey
Country Date Name of
Framework 
(& sub-parts) 
Type of 
Framework
Scope Main stakeholders 
involved in development 
of guidance
Targeted 
Constituency
Responsibility
for implementation 
UK
Denmark
Norway
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Brazil 2008
2009
- Green Protocol
(Protocolo de
intenções) for
Public Banks
- Green Protocol
for Private
Banks
Voluntary
guidelines
- Environmental & Social
Risk Management
- General Environmental
Management
- Green Products & Services
- Ministry of Environment
- Public Banks
- Banking Association
(Febraban) and Private
Banks
Public and private banks 
who are signatories to the
protocols
N/A
Colombia 2012 Green Protocol Voluntary
guidelines
- Environmental & Social
Risk Management
- General Environmental
Management
- Green Products & Services
- Ministry of Environment
and Sustainable
Development
- Banking Association
(Asobancaria)
- Commercial banks 
- Public banks
The ﬁnancial sector in general,
signatories are public and
private banks
N/A
Financial institutions and
other entities authorized by
the Central Bank of Brazil.
- Central Bank
of Brazil
- Central Bank of Brazil
- Banking Association
(Febraban) and Private Banks
- Social and Environmental
Responsibility Policy
(PRSA) guidelines
(governance structure and
management of
environmental risks)
Mandatory
regulation
Resolution
N.4.327
2014
2008
2009
2010
2011
- Resolution 3545
on the Amazon
Biome
- Resolution 3813
on Sugar Cane
- Resolution 3876
on Slave Labor
- Circular 3547 on
ICAAP
Mandatory
regulation
- Conditions for granting
rural credit
- Financing biofuel
production
- Prohibiting slave labour
- Risk assessment and
capital suﬃciency
- Central Bank of Brazil Regulated ﬁnancial
institutions, ﬁnancial
institutions integrated in the
National Rural Credit System
(SNCR)
N/A
Peru 2014 TBD Mandatory
regulation
- Environmental & Social
Risk Management
- Superintendence of Banks,
Insurance and Pension
Funds (SBS)
All Peruvian banks SBS
LATIN AMERCIA
Other countries where practitioners and/or regulators are signiﬁcantly* engaged on sustainability issues: Mexico, Paraguay.
*E.g. further instances where frameworks may be under preparation or where some form of on-going dialogue / collaborative action is underway (e.g.
via dedicated networks or “clubs”).
USA 2010 - SEC Commission
Guidance
Regarding
Disclosure
Related to
Climate Change
Implementation
Guidance
Disclosure related to Climate
Change Issues as regards: 
- compliance with
environmental laws.
- risk investment
- liquidity, capital resources
and results of operations 
- material risks
- environmental issues
aﬀectation to assets
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)
Public companies &
Foreign Private Issuers
N/A
NORTH AMERCIA
Country Date Name of
Framework 
(& sub-parts) 
Type of 
Framework
Scope Main stakeholders 
involved in development 
of guidance
Targeted 
Constituency
Responsibility
for implementation 
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Glossary of ﬁnancial regulation terms
For readers that are less familiar with some of the technical ﬁnancial regulation language used in this
study, a glossary of key terms is presented below. Useful resources for further explanations can be
found at www.bis.org and www.oecd.org.
The risk that one party to a ﬁnancial contract will fail to discharge an
obligation and thus cause the other party to incur a ﬁnancial loss.
Capital buﬀer
Credit risk
Leverage ratio
Liquidity coverage ratio
Liquidity risk
Macroprudential
analysis
Market risk
Net stable funding ratio
Operational risk
OTC derivatives 
Systemic risk
Mandatory capital that ﬁnancial institutions are required to hold in addition
to other minimum capital requirements.
A ratio used to calculate the ﬁnancial leverage of a company to get an idea
of the company's ability to meet ﬁnancial obligations.
The liquidity coverage ratio is designed to ensure that ﬁnancial institutions
have the necessary assets on hand to ride out short-term liquidity
disruptions. Banks are required to hold an amount of highly-liquid assets,
such as cash or Treasury bonds, equal to or greater than their net cash over
a 30 day period (having at least 100% coverage).
The risk that assets may not be readily available to meet a demand for cash. 
The assessment and monitoring of the strengths and vulnerabilities of
ﬁnancial systems.
The risk of losses on ﬁnancial instruments arising from changes in market
prices. Market risk covers interest rate, foreign exchange, equity price, and
commodity price risk.
The net stable funding (NSF) ratio measures the amount of longer-term, stable
sources of funding employed by an institution relative to the liquidity proﬁles of
the assets funded and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity
arising from oﬀ-balance sheet commitments and obligations.
The risk arising from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and
systems, or from external events (including legal risk).
A security traded in some context other than on a formal exchange. The
phrase ‘over-the-counter’ can be used to refer to stocks that trade via a
dealer network as opposed to on a centralised exchange.
The risk that the inability of one institution to meet its obligations will
cause other institutions to be unable to meet their obligations. Such a
failure may cause signiﬁcant liquidity or credit problems and, as a result,
could threaten the stability of or conﬁdence in markets. Systemic risk
therefore refers to the risks imposed by interlinkages and
interdependencies in a system or market.
34
References
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2001) ‘Key
issues in developing an IRB Approach to Project Finance’,
Consultative Document on the Internal Ratings-Based
Approach (superseded document)
<www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>.
BCBS (2001) ‘Working Paper on the Internal Ratings-Based
Approach to Specialised Lending Exposures’
<www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp9.pdf>.
•BCBS (2006) ‘International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework’
<www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf>.
BCBS (2008) ‘Is climate change a big deal for the ﬁnancial
system?’, Speech by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy
Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at Bank Indonesia’s Annual
International ruding a seminar on Macroeconomic Impact of
Climate Change: Opportunities and Challenges, Bali, 2 August
2008 <www.bis.org/review/r080812d.pdf>.
BCBS (2011) ‘Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for
remuneration’, <www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs197.pdf>.
BCBS (2011) ‘The transmission channels between the
ﬁnancial and real sectors: a critical survey of the literature’,
Working Paper No. 18 <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp18.pdf>.
BCBS (2011), ‘Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks’,
Progress Report to G20, <www.bis.org/publ/othp17.htm>.
BCBS (2012) ‘Models and tools for macroprudential analysis’,
Working Paper No. 21 <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp21.pdf>.
BCBS (2012) ‘The policy implications of transmission
channels between the ﬁnancial system and the real
economy’, Working Paper No 20
<www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp20.pdf>.
BCBS (2013) ‘Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment
Program (RCAP)’ <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs264.pdf>.
Bloomberg NEF (2013) ‘Financial regulation – biased against
clean energy and green infrastructure?’ White Paper,
Bloomberg New Energy Finance <about.bnef.com/white-
papers/ﬁnancial-regulation-biased-against-clean-energy-and-
green-infrastructure/>. 
BNP Paribas ‘Impact of new ﬁnancial regulations on Project
Finance State of the play and ways forward’ Corporate and
Investment Banking <www.astrid-online.it/DISCIPLINA2/
PROJECT-FI/Documenti/Regulatory-Framework-and-Project-
Finance---BNP-Paribas.pdf>.
Brinke K. (2013) ‘The Turkish 2000-01 Banking Crisis’,
Rabobank-Economic Research Department. <
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/septe
mber/the-turkish-2000-01-banking-crisis/> 
Canuto, O. and Cavallari, M. (2013) 'Integrating monetary policy
and macroprudential regulation'
<www.voxeu.org/article/integrating-monetary-policy-and-
macroprudential-regulation>.
Carr G. (2012) ‘Renewable energy projects seek investment
alternatives’ <www.risk.net/energy-
risk/feature/2164046/renewable-energy-projects-seek-investment
-alternatives>.
CGFS (2012) ‘Operationalising the selection and application of
macroprudential instruments’, Committee on the Global Financial
System (CGFS), Paper No 48 <www.bis.org/publ/cgfs48.pdf>.
Claessens, S. and Valencia, F. (2013) 'The interaction between
monetary and macroprudential policies',
<www.voxeu.org/article/interaction-between-monetary-and-
macroprudential-policies>.
Clay et al (1999), ‘An Evaluation of HMG’s Response to the
Montserrat Volcanic Emergency’. DFID 1. 117.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/ﬁle/67965/ev635s.pdf> 
Climate Bonds Initiative (2012) ‘How Covered Bond markets can
be adapted for Renewable Energy Finance and how this could
Catalyse Innovation in Low-Carbon Capital Markets’
<www.climatebonds.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Climate-
Bonds_RE-covered-bonds_22May20121.pdf>.
Climate Institute, ‘Climate Change Best Practice Methodology’,
Asset Owners Disclosure Project
<aodproject.net/images/docs/ClimateChangeBestPracticeMethod
ology.pdf>.
Culp, C. L. and Forrester, J. P. (2012) ‘Structured Financing
Techniques in Oil and Gas Project Finance’, in: Kramer, A.S. and
Fusaro, P. C., Energy and Environmental Project Finance Law and
Taxation, Oxford University Press, pp 521-556 <www.rmcsinc.com/
articles/CLCJPF.pdf>.
Dusina, M. and Abos, J. R. (2012) ‘How Europe's New Credit
Enhancements For Project Finance Bonds Could Aﬀect Ratings’
Standard & Poor’s Credit FAQ, 13 November 2012,
<www.eib.europa.eu/attachments/standardpoors_new_credit_en
hancements_for_projects_20121113.pdf>.
EIB (2009) ‘The ﬁnancial crisis and the PPP market’
<www.eib.org/epec/resources/epec-credit-crisis-paper-
abridged.pdf>.
Eichengreen, B., 'Toward a new international ﬁnancial architecture'
(Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 1999),
pp.80-82.
Financial Stability Board (FSB) Enhanced Disclosure Task Force
(EDTF) (2012) ‘Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks‘
<www.ﬁnancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_ 121029b.pdf>.
35
Financial Stability Forum (2000), ‘Report of the Follow-up Group
on Incentives to Foster Implementation Standards’
<www.fsforum.org>. 
FSB (2013a) ‘Financial regulatory factors aﬀecting the availability
of long-term investment ﬁnance’
<www.ﬁnancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130216a.pdf>.
FSB (2013b) ‘Update on ﬁnancial regulatory factors aﬀecting the
supply of long-term investment ﬁnance’
<www.ﬁnancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829g.pdf>.
FSB (2013c) Enhanced Disclosure Task Force (EDTF) ‘Enhancing
the Risk Disclosures of Banks’
<www.ﬁnancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130821a.pdf>.
G20 (2009) Leader’s Statement Pittsburgh Summit, September
2009 <ec.europa.eu/ commission_2010-
2014/president/pdf/statement_20090826_en_2.pdf>.
G20 (2011) ‘Communiqué’, G20 Ministerial Meeting on
Development <www.g20.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/g20_resources/library/Communique_G20_Ministe
rial_Meeting_on_Development_Washington_DC_23_Septemb
er_2011.pdf>
Gardner, D. and Wright, W. ‘Project Finance’ HSCB Global
Banking and Markets
<www.hsbcnet.com/gbm/attachments/products-
services/ﬁnancing/project-ﬁnance.pdf>.
Goodhart, C. A. E. (2011) The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision: A History of the Early Years 1974-1997, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Groobey C. et al. (2010) ‘Project Finance primer for Renewable
Energy and Clean Tech Projects’ Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich &
Rosati Professional Corporation,
<www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/ctp_guide.pdf>.
Hornbeck R. (2012) ‘The Enduring Impact of the American Dust
Bowl: Short- and Long-Run Adjustments to Environmental
Catastrophe’ American Economic Review 102(4), pp 1477.
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2014),
‘Green Finance’, Twelfth Report of Session 2013-14, Volume I
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/
cmselect/cmenvaud/191/191.pdf>.
Huppe, G.A. (2013) ‘What are Investor Coalitions Doing on
Financial Regulatory Reform?’
<www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/investment_investor_coalitions.pdf>.
IAIS (2013) ‘Macroprudential Policy and Surveillance in
insurance‘, International Association of Insurance Supervisors,
<www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm?src =1/19149.pdf>.
IEA-RETD (2011) ‘Renewable Energy Technology Deployment’,
<iea-retd.org/wp-content/ uploads/2011/11/RISK-IEA-RETD-
2011-6.pdf>. 
IFC (2014) ‘Moving Forward with Environmental and Social Risk
Management’, <www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
3a1098804316ae1fb602fe384c61d9f7/ESRM-Report-
Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>.
IISD (2008) ‘The Climate Principles: A framework for the ﬁnance
sector’, <www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/ﬁles/The-Climate-
Principles-English.pdf>.
Inderst, G. (2013) ‘Private Infrastructure Finance and Investment in
Europe’, <www.eib.org/
attachments/efs/economics_working_paper_2013_02_en.pdf>.
IPCC (2013) ‘Summary for Policymakers’ In: Stocker, T. F., et al. (eds.)
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
USA.
Jones, A. I. A., et al. (2013) ‘Resource constraints: sharing a ﬁnite
world’ Institute and Faculty of Actuaries
<www.actuaries.org.uk/sites/all/ﬁles/Resource_IoA_Report per
cent20Print per cent 20copy.pdf>.
Justice, S. (2009) ‘Private Financing of Renewable Energy – A Guide
for Policymakers’, EIB Working Paper
<www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/ﬁles/public/Research/Ener
gy, per cent20 Environment per cent20and per
cent20Development/1209_ﬁnanceguide.pdf>.
Kaminker, Ch. and Stewart, F. (2012) ‘The Role of Institutional
Investors in Financing Clean Energy’, OECD Working Papesr on
Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No.23
<www.oecd.org/environment/WP_23_TheRoleOfInstitutionalInves
torsInFinancingCleanEnergy.pdf>.
Kapoor, S. (2011) ‘Funding the GND’, <re-
deﬁne.org/sites/default/ﬁles/GEF-Funding per cent20 the per cent
20GND per cent20web.pdf>.
Kindleberger, C.P. and R.Z. Aliber (2011), 'Manias, Panics and
Crashes'. Sixth Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, USA, pp. 29-33. 
Kretzschmarm, G.L., McNeil, A.J. and Kirchner, A. (2009) ‘Scenario
based economic capital principles- Why banks are undercapitalised’
<vidiowiki.com/media/paper/0ICGHIm-Y3lU per cent 20SSRN-
id1318264.pdf>.
Kroll Bond Ratings (2013), ‘Project Finance Rating Methodology’,
<www.krollbondratings.com/show_report/893>.
Lambert, C., Noth, F., and Schüwer, U. (2011) ‘How do Banks React
to Increased Credit Risk: Evidence from Hurricane Katrina’
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2083732&download=yes>.
Landon-Lane, J., Rockoﬀ, H., and Steckel, R. H. (2011) ‘Droughts,
Floods, and Financial Distress in the United States’ in: Libecap G. D.,
and Steckel R. H. (eds) The Economics of Climate Change:
Adaptations Past and Present, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, USA.
Leichenko, R., O’Brien K. and Solecki W. (2009) ‘Climate Change and
the Global Financial Crisis <www.ihdp.unu.edu/ﬁle/get/7702>.
Linklaters (2011) ‘Basel III and project ﬁnance’, Project Finance
International Issue 460
<www.linklaters.com/pdfs/mkt/london/A13781114.pdf>.
36
Mechler, R. (2003) ‘Macroeconomic Impacts of Natural
Disasters’ <www.researchgate.net/
publication/237643342_Macroeconomic_Impacts_of_Natur
al_Disasters/ﬁle/3deec5290c8ead3c74.pdf>.
Mechler, R. (2003) ‘Natural Disaster Risk Management and
Financing Disaster Losses in Developing Countries’
<digbib.ubka.uni-karlsruhe.de/volltexte/documents/1354>.
Meyer, B. (2011) ‘Macroeconomic modelling of sustainable
development and the links between the economy and the
environment’ <ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/studies_
modelling/pdf/report_macroeconomic.pdf>.
Milken Institute (2012) ‘Developing Innovative Energy
Infrastructure’ Financial Innovations Lab®Report
<www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/energyinfraﬁnancing.pdf>.
Moody’s (2011) ‘Basel III: How it will reshape the playing ﬁeld
for global project ﬁnance’
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=AW8gjPj9I7M>.
Narbel, P. (2013) ‘The Likely Impact of Basel III on a Bank's
Appetite for Renewable Energy Financing’
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341519>.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2013) The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty,
and Economics for a Warming World, Yale University Press.
Norton, J. J. (1995) ‘Devising International Banking
Supervisory Standards’ Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD 2013) 'Climate and Carbon - Aligning Prices and Policy’
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment-and-sustainable-
development/climate-and-carbon_5k3z11hjg6r7-en.
Orgeldinger, J. (2005) ‘Basel II and project ﬁnance - The
development of a Basel II conforming rating model’,
<s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/web.xrh.unipi.gr/Cont
ent Pages/957079587.pdf>.
Plimmer, G. and Wigglesworth, R. (2012) ‘Monoline revival
could aid infrastructure’,
<www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9790c5c2-d27b-11e1-8700-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl# axzz34seYvAq7>.
Pollitt, M., et al. (2010) ‘A Scoping Study on the
Macroeconomic View of Sustainability’, Final report for the
European Commission, DG Environment,
<ec.europa.eu/environment/ enveco/studies_modelling/
pdf/sustainability_macroeconomic.pdf>.
Rockström, J., et al. (2009) ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring
the Safe Operating Space for Humanity’, Ecology and Society
14(2): 32 <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/
art32/>.
Rogner, H.-H., et al. (2007) ‘Introduction’ in: Metz, B. et al. (eds.),
Climate Change 2007: Mitigation, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Rothe, D. (2013) ‘Ratings bleiben für den Kapitalmarkt essenziell‘
Börsen-Zeitung, 1 June 2013 <www.boersen-
zeitung.de/ajax/bzpro_artikel.php?objt_id=20131>.
S&P Capital IQ (2011) ‘Basel III And Solvency II Regulations Could
Bring A Sea Change In Global Project Finance Funding’
www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.
do?articleId= 968709&SctArtId=137325&
from=CM&nsl_code=LIME
Schinasi G.J., 'Safeguarding Financial Stability - Theory and Practice'
(International Monetary Fund 2006), pp. 47-66.
Shearman and Sterling (2013) ‘Basel III Framework: US/EU
Comparison’, Client Publication <www.shearman.com/en/
newsinsights/publications/2013/09/basel-iii-framework-useu-
comparison>.
Shearman and Sterling (2014) ‘Basel III Framework: Net Stable
Funding Ratio (Proposed Standards)’
<www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2
014/02/BaselIII FrameworkNetStableFunding
RatioProposed per cent20StandardsFIAFR020614.pdf>.
Shimizu & Fujimura (2010), ‘Accounting in disaster and Accounting
for Disasters: The Crisis of the Great Kanto Earthquake, Japan,
1923’, 20 Accounting, Business & Financial History 3, 303.
Spencer, T. and Stevenson, J. (2013) ‘EU Low-Carbon Investment
and New Financial Sector Regulation: What Impacts and What
Policy Response?’ Working Paper No 5
<www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-
debat/WP0513_TS per cent20JS_ﬁnancial per
cent20regulation.pdf>.
Standard & Poor’s (2009) ‘Summary of Standard & Poor's Criteria
Methodology for Reﬁnancing Risk in PPP/PFI Projects’ 28 October
2009 (Not publicly available).
Standard & Poor’s (2011) ‘Why Basel III and Solvency II will hurt
corporate borrowing in Europe more than in the US’ <www.ima-
france.com/load_conference/BaseIII-And-Solvency II.pdf.
Standard & Poor’s (2013) ‘Request for Comment: Global Project
Finance Methodology for the Construction Phase’
<www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_EMEA/Michel
a BarilettinJamesHoskins-GlobalProjectFinance
Methodology.pdf>.
Stockholm Resilience Centre (2009), ‘Tipping towards the
unknown’ <www.stockholmresilience.org/
research/researchnews/tippingtowardstheunknown
.5.7cf9c5aa121e17bab42800021543.html>.
37
UNEP FI (2013) ‘Investor Brieﬁng on Portfolio Carbon - Measuring,
disclosing and managing the carbon intensity of investments and
investment portfolios’
<www.unepﬁ.org/ﬁleadmin/documents/UNEP_FI_Investor_Brieﬁn
g_Portfolio_Carbon.pdf>
UNEP FI (2014) ‘Inquiry: Design of a Sustainable Financial System’
<www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=
2758&ArticleID=10698>.
UNEP/BNEF (2013) ‘Global Trends in Renewable Energy
Investment’, Frankfurt School UNEP Collaborating Centre for
Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance <fs-unep-centre.org/
publications/global-trends-renewable-energy-investment-2013>.
United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP
FI) (2011) 'Universal Ownership: Why environmental externalities
matter to institutional investors’
<www.unepﬁ.org/ﬁleadmin/documents/universal_ownership_full.
pdf>.
Van Vuuren, D. and Kriegler, E. (2011) ‘A framework for a new
generation of socioeconomic scenarios for climate change impact,
adaptation, vulnerability and mitigation research’ Working Paper
<www.isp.ucar.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/Scenario_FrameworkPaper
_15aug11_0.pdf>. 
Vivid Economics (2014) ‘Financing Green Growth’
<www.vivideconomics.com/uploads/ reports/ﬁnancing-green-
growth/Financing_Green_Growth.pdf>.
Watson, Farley & William (2012) ‘Project ﬁnance brieﬁng’ February
2012
<http://www.wfw.com/Publications/Publication1016/$File/WFW-
Basel-III-ProjectFinance-Feb2012.pdf>.
Wells, C., et al. (2010) ‘Universal Lessons from Brazil’ in: (eds.)
Report: Sustainable Banking: Risk, Reward and the Future of
Finance, Thomson Reuters.
World Economic Forum (2013) ‘Creating a sustainable energy
future through trade’, Green Light, Global Agenda Council on
Governance for Sustainability of the World Economic Forum,
<www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2013/WEF_GAC_GovernanceSust
ainability_Green Light_November_Report_2013.pdf>.
World Economic Forum (2013) ‘The Green Investment Report –
The ways and means to unlock private ﬁnance and green growth’
<www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GreenInvestment
_Report_2013.pdf>.
38
Interviews and seminars
The authors would like to thank the following people and institutions for participating in
interviews and seminars with the research project. In cooperating with the project, they do 
not express any opinion on the recommendations, conclusions or statements in this report. 
21.11.2013 Buglass, Andrew Managing Director, Head of Energy Structured Finance, The Royal Bank
of Scotland, England
21.05.2014 Turner, Philip Economist, Bank for International Settlements
Dhumale Rahul, Dr.
Collazos, Paul Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP, Peru
Head of Risk Control, UBS Investment Bank25.03.2014
13.05.2014
Kotsovos, George
Head: Group Sustainability Management, Standard Bank Group, 
South Africa
Standard Bank Group, South Africa
04.06.2014 Collazos, Paul Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP, Peru
22.05.2014 Yanfei, Ye
Ireton, Karin
Prudential Regulation team Prudential Regulation Authority, Bank of England28.05.2014
05.06.2014 Di Noia, Carmine
Athaide, Malcolm
Deputy Director General, Head Capital Markets and Listed Companies
Assonime, Italy
Cornford, Dr. Andrew Observatoire de la Finance, Geneva, Switzerland24.07.2014
Nieto, Maria Banca de Espana25.08.2014 
10.07.2014 Vikas, Namita Senior President & Country Head - Responsible Banking, and Chief
10.06.2014
Hong, Yin
Sardenberg, Rubens
13.06.2014
17.06.2014
Senior Vice President, ICBC, Beijing, China
Chief Economist, Brazilian Federation of Banks(Febraban), Brazil
Senior President & Chief Risk Oﬃcer – Retail, Business & Inclusive
Banking, YES BANK, India
Vasconcelos, Mario Sergio Institutional Aﬀairs (environmental) Brazilian Federation of Banks
(Febrabon) Brazil
Deputy Director General of the China Banking Regulatory Commision
Statistics Department
Schnaar-Campbell,
Annelie    
20.05.2014
09.05.2014
21.05.2014
30.05.2014
Schydlowsky, Dr. Daniel Head of Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP, Peru
Thompson, Robert Former Counsel to US Environmental Protection Agency, New York,
Wells, Christopher
Ronquest, Madeleine
Zhang, Rong Environment, Social and Governance Policy Department of the IFC in
Washington DC
Head: Regulatory Impact and Strategy, Standard Bank Group
Head of Environmental Risk Dpt. Bank Santander, Brazil
Head Environment and Social Risk, FirstRand Regulatory Risk
Management, South Africa
Discussion and presentation at Bloomberg New Energy Finance
21-
22.05.2014
Hassett, Timothy Director Special Project - Sustainable Finance World Wildlife Fund, Basel
Discussion and Presentation at Global Infrastructure Basel (GIB)
Foundation Global Infrastructure Basel (GIB) Foundation
30.05.2014
-
39
About us
About CISL
The University of Cambridge Institute for
Sustainability Leadership (CISL) brings
together business, government and academia
to ﬁnd solutions to critical sustainability
challenges. Capitalising on the world-class,
multidisciplinary strengths of the University of
Cambridge, CISL deepens leaders’ insight and
understanding through its executive
programmes, builds deep, strategic
engagement with leadership companies, and
creates opportunities for collaborative enquiry
and action through its business platforms.
Over 25 years, we have developed a
leadership network with more than 5,000
alumni from leading global organisations and
an expert team of Fellows, Senior Associates
and staﬀ. HRH The Prince of Wales is the
patron of CISL and has inspired and supported
many of our initiatives.
About the BEI
The Chief Executives of some of the world’s
largest banks created the Banking
Environment Initiative (BEI) in 2010. Its
mission is to lead the banking industry in
collectively directing capital towards
environmentally and socially sustainable
economic development. At the heart of the
group’s vision lies a simple thesis: banks work
for their clients and an initiative like this will
only work if it is aligned with their interests
and vice versa.
The BEI achieves its mission by focusing on
topics where industry-wide action is needed,
working in partnership with its customer base
by bringing independent thinking to bear on
the issues and through the active leadership
of its Chief Executives.
About UNEP FI
UNEP FI is a partnership between UNEP and
the global ﬁnancial sector created in the wake
of the 1992 Earth Summit with a mission to
promote sustainable ﬁnance. Over 200
ﬁnancial institutions, including banks, insurers
and fund managers, work with UNEP to
understand today’s environmental challenges,
why they matter to ﬁnance, and how to
actively participate in addressing them. 
UNEP FI has produced extensive research to
reveal and explain the intersection between
ﬁnance and the environment. It has also
produced practical tools to raise awareness
and to build capacity among practitioners. In
recent years UNEP FI’s work has also included
a strong focus on policy – by fomenting
country-level dialogues between ﬁnance
practitioners and their policy-makers, and, at
the international level, by promoting ﬁnancial
sector involvement in processes such as the
global climate negotiations.
About Bloomberg LP
Bloomberg, the global business and ﬁnancial
information and news leader, gives inﬂuential
decision makers a critical edge by connecting
them to a dynamic network of information,
people and ideas. The company’s strength –
delivering data, news and analytics through
innovative technology, quickly and accurately
– is at the core of the Bloomberg Professional
service, which provides real-time ﬁnancial
information to more than 320,000 subscribers
globally.
Cambridge insight, policy inﬂuence, business impact
The University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) brings
together business, government and academia to ﬁnd solutions to critical
sustainability challenges.
Capitalising on the world-class, multidisciplinary strengths of the University of
Cambridge, CISL deepens leaders’ insight and understanding through its
executive programmes, builds deep, strategic engagement with leadership
companies, and creates opportunities for collaborative enquiry and action
through its business platforms.
Over 25 years, we have developed a leadership network with more than 5,000
alumni from leading global organisations and an expert team of Fellows, Senior
Associates and staﬀ. 
HRH The Prince of Wales is the patron of CISL and has inspired and supported
many of our initiatives.
Head Oﬃce
1 Trumpington Street,
Cambridge CB2 1QA, UK
T: +44 (0)1223 768850
E: info@cisl.cam.ac.uk
South Africa
PO BOX 313
Cape Town 8000, South Africa
T: +27 (0)21 469 4765
E: info.sa@cisl.cam.ac.uk
Brussels
The Pericles Building
Rue de la Scinece 23
B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
T: + 32 (0)2 894 93 20
E: info.eu@cisl.cam.ac.uk
Printed on Amadeus 100% Recycled Oﬀset an FSC-certiﬁed recycled paper. 
Produced from 100% recovered ﬁbre and manufactured without the use of chlorine bleaching.
Design: Adrenaline Creative www.adrenalinecreative.co.uk
www.cisl.cam.ac.uk
